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TRADING PAIN FOR GAIN: ADDRESSING MISALIGNED INTERESTS
IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT ADMINISTRATION
Sheva J. Sanders*
Jessica C. Wheeler**

ABSTRACT
Over the last two decades, Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs), organizations that
act as middlemen between health plans and drug manufacturers, have become
increasingly powerful players in the healthcare industry. PBMs promise to leverage
their expertise and ability to aggregate buying power to negotiate lower drug prices and
administer prescription drug benefit plans. In practice, however, PBMs are widely
criticized for benefitting from, and contributing to, inefficiencies in the prescription drug
market, particularly by imposing restrictions on beneficiary access to drugs in exchange
for rebates paid to PBMs by manufacturers. To the extent that the rebates are retained
by PBMs, or otherwise do not result in a benefit to the beneficiaries, this practice
amounts to trading the pain of plan beneficiaries for the PBM’s own gain. Despite this
criticism, regulatory and enforcement efforts directed against PBMs have been anemic.
Existing structural and legal protections for beneficiaries are largely ineffectual.
While this problem is widely acknowledged, regulators have failed to pass new laws that
successfully address the challenges posed by the insertion of PBMs as middlemen into
the web of prescription drug benefits and reimbursement. Regulators express frustration
with the complexity of balancing the interests of beneficiaries with PBMs’ aspirational
goal of cost-control, as well as with addressing the inherent conflict of interest in PBMs’
competing goals of profitability for themselves and cost containment for their clients.
Lawsuits alleging PBM mistreatment of beneficiaries are sparse, and a consistent vision
of what is and is not permissible to PBMs has not emerged from the case law.
But the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute can—and there are indications that it
increasingly will—be used to regulate manufacturer-PBM rebate arrangements. The
U.S. Department of Justice recently settled a case predicated on an allegation that a
pharmaceutical manufacturer, Roche, violated the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute when
it paid a health insurance company, Humana, a kickback of lump sum debt forgiveness
for formulary placement, conditioned on the exclusion of a competitor. Also, the federal
government recently adopted a rule applicable to Medicare Part D plans that radically
reconfigures the existing incentives by prohibiting manufacturers from extending
rebates other than at the point of sale, and from making the rebates contingent on the
plans or PBMs taking various steps with respect to encouragement of use of the drugs.
These developments likely presage increased use of the Anti-Kickback Statute to attack
rebating arrangements and underscore the need for PBMs to reevaluate their current
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practices with respect to their relationships with manufacturers to ensure that they are
complying with the law.
In this Article, we argue that the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute and its state law
analogs, state anti-kickback statutes, can be used to effectively protect beneficiary
interests against manufacturer-purchased, PBM-imposed restrictions on access to
drugs. We also identify key issues that may be hampering effective enforcement, and
suggest an analysis that effectively addresses these issues. We demonstrate that current
law is best understood to allow manufacturers to extend discounts and rebates to plans
(either directly or through PBMs) but not to PBMs, and that those rebates cannot make
those payments contingent on PBMs or plans adopting specific preferences for drugs. By
embracing these principles, PBMs can protect beneficiary interests, achieve enforcement
certainty, and perhaps ward off the ultimate adoption of more radical restrictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) have
become increasingly prominent and powerful players in the healthcare
industry. 1 PBMs contract with health benefit plans to administer
pharmacy benefits, 2 interposing themselves as middlemen between
their client plans and drug manufacturers. PBMs promise to leverage
their expertise and ability to aggregate buying power on behalf of health
plans to negotiate lower drug prices, and administer prescription drug
benefit plans. 3 In practice, however, PBMs are widely criticized for
benefitting from, and contributing to, inefficiencies in the prescription
drug market by using that purchasing power to obtain payments from
manufacturers that they retain for their own account, rather than pass
through to plans and the individuals who receive benefits under the
plans (beneficiaries). Despite this criticism, regulatory and
enforcement efforts directed against PBMs have been anemic.
Confounded regulators have attempted and failed to pass new laws that
successfully address the challenges posed by the insertion of PBMs into
the web of prescription drug benefits and reimbursement, expressing
frustration with the complexity of balancing the interests of
beneficiaries with PBMs’ aspirational goal of cost-control. Lawsuits
alleging PBM mistreatment of beneficiaries are rare, and a consistent
vision of what is and is not permissible to PBMs has not emerged from
the case law.

1. PBMs first began to appear in the 1970s but became substantially more prominent after
the passage of the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act, which created the Medicare Part D drug
benefit. See generally Mike Magee, The Origin Story of PBM’s, HEALTHCOMMENTARY (Aug. 13, 2020),
http://www.healthcommentary.org/2020/08/13/the-origin-story-of-pbms/ [https://perma.cc/YBQ499AN].
2. PBMs typically offer the following core services in the administration of pharmacy
benefits: (1) Contracting with a network of retail pharmacies to dispense drugs to beneficiaries in
exchange for a patient copayment established by the plan and a set, discounted payment from the
plan; (2) Processing, approving, denying, and otherwise adjudicating claims for drugs submitted
by pharmacies; and (3) Obtaining rebates from manufacturers.
3. See, e.g., John Arnold, Are Pharmacy Benefit Managers the Good Guys or Bad Guys of Drug
Pricing?, STAT (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/27/pharmacy-benefitmanagers-good-or-bad/ [https://perma.cc/6JBA-YHQ4] (“PBMs started with the idea that their
buying power would reduce health care costs and pass the savings on to consumers. They act like
giant buying networks for drugs, representing consumers from multiple employers and insurers.
In economic terms, they aggregate demand, which gives them leverage in the market. PBMs use
their buying power, combined with utilization management strategies, to lower the total cost of
pharmaceuticals.”).
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There are indications that the enforcement landscape is changing.
The U.S. Department of Justice recently settled a case which alleged
that pharmaceutical manufacturer Roche violated the Federal AntiKickback Statute (AKS) when it paid a health insurance company,
Humana, a kickback of lump sum debt forgiveness for formulary
placement, conditioned on the exclusion of competitors. 4 Also, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) recently adopted a
rule amending the discount safe harbor to the AKS with respect to the
safe harbor’s application to drugs covered under Medicare Part D plans
(the New Rule). The New Rule radically reconfigures existing incentives
by (via the denial of safe-harbor treatment 5) prohibiting manufacturers
from extending rebates except at the point-of-service (to ensure that
the rebate results in a discount in the drug price that plans and
beneficiaries pay) and from making those rebates contingent on either
PBMs or plans taking certain actions to promote the drugs. 6 These
developments suggest the AKS is useful for addressing the harms
wrought on beneficiaries by runaway PBM self-interest, and
underscore the necessity for PBMs to reevaluate their current practices
to ensure that they are in accord with the law.
Since 2014, prescription drug prices in the United States have
increased by thirty-three percent, compared to an increase of seventeen
percent across prices for all medical items and services. 7 The meteoric
rise of prescription drug costs 8 has prompted increasingly creative

4. See Adam Lidgett, Whistleblower Gets $3.6M in FCA Deal with Roche, Humana, LAW360 (Feb.
8, 2021, 5:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/illinois/articles/1353175/whistleblower-gets-3-6m-infca-deal-with-roche-humana [https://perma.cc/RB2J-78TF]. There have been other False Claims
Act cases involving similar allegations but alleging different predicate violations. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D. Pa. 2004). In
that case, which ultimately settled for over $137 million, the FCA claim was based on a violation of
the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 (“AKA”) and the common law, predicated on the fact that among
other things, Medco, a PBM affiliated with Merck, favored Merck drugs over other manufacturers’
drugs even though Merck drugs were more expensive. See id.; Anti-Kickback Act of 1986, 41 U.S.C.
§ 51 (current version at 41 U.S.C. ch. 87); Settlement Agreement & Mutual Releases, United States
v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., No. 99-cv-2332 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2006), https://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/1170650/000119312506217137/dex101.htm [https://perma.cc/MA33-FHSY].
5. Without the protection of the safe harbor, almost all rebates at least technically implicate
the AKS, as they are “remuneration” given to induce a purchase of a covered item. See infra Section
III.D.
6. See Reductions in Price on Prescription Pharmaceuticals and Certain Pharmacy Benefit
Manager Service Fees, 85 Fed. Reg. 76666, 76731 (Nov. 30, 2020) [hereinafter PBM Final Rule].
7. Tori Marsh, Prices for Prescription Drugs Rise Faster than Prices for Any Other Medical Good or
Service, GOODRX HEALTH (Sept. 17, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.goodrx.com/blog/prescriptiondrugs-rise-faster-than-medical-goods-or-services/ [https://perma.cc/ZPD7-SN34].
8. Alison Kodjac, Prescription Drug Costs Driven by Manufacturer Price Hikes, Not Innovation,
NPR (Jan. 7, 2019, 5:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/01/07/682986630
/prescription-drug-costs-driven-by-manufacturer-price-hikes-not-innovation
[https://perma.cc/2VFG-ABS5]. Explanations range from innovation in hyper-specialty drugs for
the treatment of rare diseases to a complex web of incentives created by the interplay of the U.S.
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efforts by many, including managed care plans, 9 to control drug
spending. 10 One method managed care plans have used to lower the
cost of covered pharmaceuticals is to hire PBMs to negotiate rebate
arrangements with manufacturers. 11 The manufacturer offers to return
a portion of the drug’s purchase price if certain conditions, such as “if
the total number of prescriptions dispensed, relative to other medicines
in the therapeutic class, exceeds a predetermined threshold” 12 or
conferring preferential access to the manufacturer’s drugs, are
fulfilled. 13
The main tool that PBMs use to negotiate and earn rebates is the
prescription drug formulary, which is a list of drugs that the plan covers
along with the conditions under which coverage is available.14 By
erecting and removing barriers to access to particular drugs—such as
copayments, prior authorization, and step-therapy—formularies can
be used to prefer or disadvantage particular drugs. Making rebates
contingent on the achievement of sales volume targets incentivizes
PBMs not only to include the drug on formulary, but also to design the
formulary to steer patients toward drugs that are subject to the biggest
volume rebate. 15 In some cases, the arrangements are more pointed:

patent laws, drug pricing regulation (or lack thereof), and convoluted commercial pricing
schemes. Id.
9. Managed care plans are third-party payors that attempt to manage their costs through
various utilization management techniques, including differential copayments (set with reference
to the formulary tier in which the drug is placed), step therapy, and prior authorization
requirements. For further discussion of these techniques, see infra Part I.
10. David H. Kreling, Cost Control for Prescription Drug Programs: Pharmacy Benefit Manager
(PBM) Efforts, Effects, and Implications, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 8, 2009), https://aspe.hhs.gov/cost-control-prescriptiondrug-programs-pharmacy-benefit-manager-pbm-efforts-effects-implications [https://perma.cc
/F9CU-DFBG].
11. See Rachel Bluth, Can Someone Tell Me What a PBM Does?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 9,
2019), https://khn.org/news/senate-hearing-drug-pricing-lesson-on-pharmacy-benefit-managers/
[https://perma.cc/R9HS-KA2B].
12. PHRMA, FOLLOW THE DOLLAR: UNDERSTANDING HOW THE PHARMACEUTICAL DISTRIBUTION
AND PAYMENT SYSTEM SHAPES THE PRICES OF BRAND MEDICINES 8 (2017), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org
/files/dmfile/Follow-the-Dollar-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VZ4-2YET].
13. Id.
14. PBMs collect revenue in three primary ways: from administrative fees paid to them by
plans, through the spread between what they charge plans for drugs and what they pay pharmacies
for drugs, and from retaining a portion of the rebates they are paid by manufacturers. See, e.g.,
Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, 141 S. Ct. 474, 477–78 (2020); In re Express Scripts, Inc.,
PBM Litig., No. 05-MD-01672, 2008 WL 2952787, at *5–6 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2008); United States ex
rel. Behnke v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 14-cv-824, 2020 WL 1953626, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2020).
15. See Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Their Role in Drug Spending, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr.
22,
2019),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/explainer/2019/apr/pharmacybenefit-managers-and-their-role-drug-spending#3 [https://perma.cc/W7MU-ZEX2] (“But PBMs
may also have an incentive to favor high-priced drugs over drugs that are more cost-effective.
Because they often receive rebates that are calculated as a percentage of the manufacturer’s list
price, PBMs receive a larger rebate for expensive drugs than they do for ones that may provide
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instead of conditioning rebates merely on attaining volume targets,
pharmaceutical manufacturers may also condition discounts and
rebates specifically on PBMs giving their drugs preferential formulary
status vis-à-vis non-drug alternatives, or on imposing access
restrictions on competitor drugs. 16 Accordingly, whether implicitly
incentivized or explicitly required, rebates often come at the cost of
utilization controls that restrict beneficiary access to competitor drugs.
PBMs justify such restrictions on access as necessary to give them the
negotiating leverage that makes them valuable to plans and
beneficiaries, maintaining that PBMs make trades and strike
agreements with pharmaceutical manufacturers in order to design a
formulary that reduces prescription drug costs on the whole. 17
The use of a formulary imposes costs on beneficiaries which might
include barriers to access to competitive drugs, inconvenience, limited
coverage, poorer clinical outcomes, and higher out-of-pocket prices for
drugs, copayments, and premiums. To the extent that these costs are
offset by a corresponding reduction in price in the preferred drug that
is realized by the beneficiary either as a point-of-sale discount or
through a reduction in premium cost, the costs may be seen as a fair
trade. But when manufacturers adjust drug prices by offering rebates,
rather than simply discounting the list price of the drugs, they create an
opportunity for PBMs to siphon off, and retain for their own account, a
portion of the negotiated “savings.” 18 More fundamentally, rebates
incentivize the PBM to prefer the drug with the highest rebate rather
than the lowest price. 19 In many instances, the PBM may not even

better value at lower cost. As a result, people who have a high-deductible plan or have copays based
on a drug’s list price may incur higher out-of-pocket costs.”).
16. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FACT SHEET: TRUMP ADMINISTRATION PROPOSES
TO LOWER DRUG COSTS BY TARGETING BACKDOOR REBATES AND ENCOURAGING DIRECT DISCOUNTS TO
PATIENTS (2019), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/20190131-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc
/M8TG-RDHY] [hereinafter BACKDOOR REBATES]. HHS advanced a proposal to “update the
discount safe harbor at 42 CFR 1001.952(h) to explicitly exclude reductions in price offered by drug
manufacturers to PBMs, Part D, and Medicaid managed care plans from the safe harbor’s
definition of a ‘discount’” and to “create a new safe harbor designed specifically for price
reductions on pharmaceutical products, but only those that are reflected in the price charged to the
patient at the pharmacy counter,” because “to the extent that these rebate payments are made to
secure preferential formulary treatment, they are not functioning like a reduction in price.” Id.
17. See generally Formulary Design, PHARM. CARE MGMT. ASS’N, https://www.pcmanet.org
/policy-issues/formulary-design/ [https://perma.cc/9LSG-BVTC] (“The effective use of formularies
can minimize overall medical costs” when “[a] number of cost-saving elements are . . . factored in,
such as formulary tiers and step therapy.”).
18. See Jake Frenz, Industry Voices—Why It’s Time for PBM Rebates to Come to an End, FIERCE
HEALTHCARE (Apr. 8, 2019, 10:42 AM), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/industry-voiceswhy-it-s-time-for-pbm-rebates-to-come-to-end [https://perma.cc/2YJX-FSKN] (“But rather than
passing negotiated cost savings through to health plans or self-insured companies, who are the
customers of the PBM and ultimate payers of the pharmacy benefit, PBMs have largely kept these
disbursements for themselves.”).
19. See Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Their Role in Drug Spending, supra note 15.
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disclose the rebates to its client-plans, let alone the plans’
beneficiaries. 20 For beneficiaries, the net result of this scheme can be
restricted access to therapies that they may prefer (either because of
convenience, cost, or clinical efficacy), with no offsetting decrease in
overall out-of-pocket costs. 21 Because of this dynamic, it is widely
acknowledged that rebate arrangements with PBMs have the potential
to harm beneficiaries in a manner that standard, up-front discount
arrangements do not. 22
When the financial benefits from trading access restrictions for
price concessions accrue only to the PBMs, beneficiary interests are
harmed, and more broadly, the primary goal of managed care—
providing appropriate medical care in an economically efficient
manner 23—is undermined. Accordingly, PBMs’ practice of retaining the
financial benefits of their buying power for themselves has spawned
many efforts at reform. 24 In the main, however, these efforts have been
either piecemeal or unsuccessful. 25 In this Article, we outline how wellestablished norms and laws, if better understood and observed, are

20. See Frenz, supra note 18 (“PBMs have kept their arrangements with drug manufacturers
opaque and secretive, allowing them to charge higher drug prices to their customers than what
they admit to paying themselves, pocketing the difference.”).
21. See Fraud and Abuse; Removal of Safe Harbor Protection for Rebates Involving
Prescription Pharmaceuticals and Creation of New Safe Harbor Protection for Certain Point-ofSale Reductions in Price on Prescription Pharmaceuticals and Certain Pharmacy Benefit
Manager Service Fees, 84 Fed. Reg. 2340, 2341–42 (proposed Feb. 6, 2019) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 1001), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-02-06/pdf/2019-01026.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FN5Q-BA25] [hereinafter Safe Harbors Proposed Rule]. The Safe Harbors
Proposed Rule notes that “[m]any rebates do not flow through to consumers at the pharmacy
counter as reductions in price,” nor do they result in robust premium reductions. Id. The rebate
system creates, moreover, “a financial incentive to [favor higher priced drugs and to] make
formulary decisions based on rebate potential, not the quality or effectiveness of a drug.” Id.
22. See, e.g., NEERAJ SOOD, ROCIO RIBERO, MARTHA RYAN & KAREN VAN NUYS, UNIV. S. CAL.
LEONARD D. SCHAFFER CTR . FOR HEALTH POL’Y & ECON ., THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DRUG
REBATES AND LIST PRICES 3 (2020), https://healthpolicy.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/
SchaefferCenter_RebatesListPrices_WhitePaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SZM-RVZQ] (finding that
“[r]ebates play a role in increasing drug prices,” including increasing out-of-pocket expenditure by
beneficiaries); see also PHRMA, supra note 12, at 2 (“But in recent years, plan sponsors have raised
doubts about this process and whether incentives are appropriately aligned across all stakeholders.
Although PBMs say they prefer lower list prices, as this paper shows, in many cases, the system
creates incentives for PBMs to prefer medicines with higher list prices and higher rebates. As a
result, some industry observers and government agencies have questioned whether insurers and
PBMs are more focused on the size of rebates than on achieving the lowest possible costs and best
outcomes for patients.”).
23. See APC Overcomes the Pitfalls of Managed Care, VERA WHOLE HEALTH (Aug. 4, 2021),
https://www.verawholehealth.com/blog/managed-care-101-goals-history-and-pitfalls
[https://perma.cc/XDQ9-BUPT].
24. See, e.g., Colleen Becker, States Regulating Pharmaceutical Benefit Managers, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/pbm-state-legislation
[https://perma.cc/YEV5-M2RE]; see also infra Part III and accompanying notes.
25. We have not identified a single successful case against a PBM or plan predicated on the
misuse of rebates.
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already adequate to restrain, if not foreclose, the practice of trading
access restrictions for rebates that are not passed through to
beneficiaries.
In Part I, we examine the harm to beneficiaries caused by a system
that allows PBMs to profit from formulary placement decisions that are
clinically, financially, or otherwise detrimental to beneficiaries. We
observe that PBMs often do not pass through to beneficiaries (either in
the form of reduced premiums or reduced cost-sharing payments) the
rebates manufacturers pay PBMs in exchange for formulary placement
and restrictions on competitor products. The result of this
arrangement, we argue, is that the PBM and the pharmaceutical
manufacturer benefit at the expense of the beneficiaries whom PBMs
are intended to serve.
In Part II, we take a closer look at the formulary design process,
arguing that without regulation, would-be protections that are built
into the PBM structure have been rendered ineffective by the extreme
misalignment of interests between PBMs and beneficiaries. Focusing
on the role of Pharmacy and Therapeutic (P&T) committees in
protecting the interests of patients, we argue that the current system—
in which P&T committee input is largely restricted to an assessment of
therapeutic utility without due regard to beneficiary costs, and often
motivated by regard for PBM profits—does not permit P&T committees
to fully realize their role and obligations. We observe that, so long as
formulary placement is ultimately determined by PBMs, and PBMs are
motivated to maximize their own profit, the presence of a P&T
committee alone will not be sufficient to protect beneficiary interests.
In Part III, we examine the AKS and by analogy, state anti-kickback
laws 26 to demonstrate that, properly understood, those laws protect
against the precise harm posed by pay-for-placement arrangements
between pharmaceutical manufacturers and PBMs. We explain that, in
the context of government health programs, payments made directly to
PBMs for inclusion of a drug on a formulary violate the AKS’s
prohibition against paying for preferential treatment of a covered item.
In the case of commercial or other non-governmental plans, such
arrangements may implicate similar prohibitions contained in state
anti-kickback laws. By limiting the ability of pharmaceutical
manufacturers to pay for formulary access or to otherwise influence

26. Many states have anti-kickback laws that parallel the AKS. See Scott B. McBride, Anthony
J. Cocuzza, Rachel Moseson & Jarrett R. Schindler, A Survey of Health Care Anti-Kickback Law at the
State Level, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER (Feb. 25, 2020) (explaining that all but one state has an AKS
analog, and thirty-five of those apply to goods and services reimbursed by private health
insurance, rather than a public payor); see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 650 (West 2021); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175H, § 3 (West 2021); MINN. STAT. § 62J.23 (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-20-4
(West 2021) .
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formulary design, the AKS and similar state laws can make it more
likely that P&T committee recommendations will be observed and more
likely that the price repremductions will either be reflected at the pointof-service or result in premium reductions.
In Part IV, we argue that by embracing what we understand to be
extant law—that manufacturers may extend discounts and rebates only
to plans, and even then, cannot make those payments contingent on
according specific preferences to drugs—PBMs can honor these
important public policy goals, achieve enforcement certainty, and
perhaps ward off the ultimate adoption of more radical restrictions.
I. THE PROBLEM: FORMULARY ACCESS RESTRICTIONS MAY NOT
SAVE PLANS OR BENEFICIARIES MONEY
Drug formularies—lists of covered drugs, from which some drugs
are excluded entirely, and which impose conditions restricting access to
some drugs—have long been viewed as a tool plans use to reduce drug
costs. In theory, the lower costs associated with the formulary reduce
beneficiary premiums and copayments. Beneficiaries are asked to
tolerate utilization controls imposed by formularies because they will
benefit from the reduced cost of healthcare. This bargain can be
fulfilled only if the restrictions are traded for price concessions that are
passed through to plans and ultimately to beneficiaries. Where the
restrictions are instead traded for payments to PBMs, it is a false
bargain.
A. Managed Care Plans Use Access Restrictions to Constrain
Utilization and Reduce Costs
Health insurers have long struggled with balancing the competing
imperatives of ensuring access to care and controlling the cost of
providing that care to beneficiaries. As the cost of care has grown, the
concept of managed care—a mechanism through which insurance and
other managed care plans, such as health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), 27 control utilization by imposing restrictions on what
providers and therapies can be used and under what circumstances—
has emerged as a key tool for controlling the cost of healthcare. A
central premise of managed care is that access restrictions, such as
prior authorization requirements, step-therapy, and beneficiary cost27. For a description of the features of various types of managed care, see Paying for Health
Care in the U.S., B.U. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/mph-modules/hpm/
americanhealthcare_paying/americanhealthcare_paying_print.html [https://perma.cc/NBJ5-49VV].
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sharing, can eliminate unnecessary costs. 28 Managed care plans apply
these utilization controls to drugs using a list of drugs that the plan
covers, known as a “formulary.” 29 The development of the formulary is
typically contracted out to a PBM as part of the administrative services
the PBM provides to the plan. 30 Drugs that are excluded from the
formulary are not covered by insurance, 31 meaning that a beneficiary
may be responsible for paying the full costs of such drugs. 32 Coverage
for drugs included on the formulary is variable. 33 Drugs that are
included on the formulary are grouped into tiers. 34 Each tier is
associated with certain access restrictions. 35 The restrictions become
28. See ROBERT P. NAVARRO & JUDITH A. CAHILL, ROLE OF MANAGED CARE IN THE U.S.
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 8, 9, https://samples.jblearning.com/0763732400/32400_CH01_Pass2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CC5V-XJMW] (explaining that a core tenet of managed care cost controls is
managing demand through controls such as copayment, coinsurance, prior authorization, and
step therapy, among others). See generally JESSICA VAN PARYS, HOW DO MANAGED CARE PLANS
REDUCE HEALTHCARE COSTS? (2014), http://www.columbia.edu/~jnv2106/jvanparys.jmp.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P8SS-JBMK] (evaluating many ways in which managed care plans reduce cost, including
access restrictions).
29. See Ana Gascon Ivey, A Guide to Medication Formularies, GOODRX (May 19, 2020), https://
www.goodrx.com/insurance/medication-formulary [https://perma.cc/2UJQ-MDYA].
30. See Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Their Role in Drug Spending, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr.
22, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/explainer/2019/apr/pharmacy-benefitmanagers-and-their-role-drug-spending [https://perma.cc/WN82-L2QD].
31. Except to the extent that the plan is subject to regulations that require a particular scope
of coverage, see, e.g., A Consumer Guide to Drug Formularies: Understanding the Fundamentals of
Behavioral Health Medication, PARITYTRACK, https://www.paritytrack.org/issue-briefs/a-consumerguide-to-drug-formularies-understanding-the-fundamentals-of-behavioral-health-medications
/#part-ii:-state-and-federal-laws-impacting-drug-formularies [https://perma.cc/HM6K-6ZMQ],
and the discussion of the requirements imposed on Part D plans infra at Part II, subject to the need
to build a formulary that is acceptable to the plan, PBMs are free to exclude or include drugs in the
formulary as they desire, with complete discretion. This can result in the exclusion of or
imposition of access barriers on particular drugs, or even on classes of drugs. See infra Subsection
I.B.3 for further discussion of the consequences of exclusion of therapeutic alternatives.
32. See Erica Block, What Is a Drug Formulary?, HEALTHCAREINSIDER (Feb. 18, 2021), https://
healthcareinsider.com/what-is-drug-formulary-60486 [https://perma.cc/H7J9-J3FQ].
33. See, e.g., In re Express Scripts, Inc., PBM Litig., No. 05-MD-01672, 2008 WL 2952787, at
*6 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2008) (“[W]here a plan participates in a formulary program, the plan’s
involvement in developing and/or controlling the formulary bears a direct relation to its savings.
For example, a formulary may be ‘closed,’ i.e. drug product selection that will be reimbursed is
limited to ‘Covered’ and/or ‘Generic’ drugs; or ‘open’, i.e. there are no limitations on the drug
products that may be reimbursed under the plan. Moreover, a formulary program may encourage
the selection of particular ‘preferred’ drugs. Under a ‘preferred’ formulary program, plans
relinquish options and control in pursuit of greater rebates.”); see also White Paper: Formulary
Development at Express Scripts, EXPRESS SCRIPTS (Dec. 2020), https://www.express-scripts.com
/aboutus/formularyinformation/development/formularyDevelopment.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW9TSG3S] (explaining the difference between open and closed formularies, and also explaining how
benefit design may be “tiered,” with generics at the lowest copay level, “preferred” prescriptions at
the next copay level, and “non-preferred” products at the highest co-pay level).
34. Block, supra note 32.
35. See id. (“Some drugs on your plan’s formulary may be covered automatically with a
doctor’s prescription. Other medications may require a prior authorization from your doctor, or
may be covered only after you’ve tried a different, preferred drug first (also known as step
therapy).”).
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less stringent as one progresses toward the most preferred tier, thereby
incentivizing the use of drugs in the preferred tier. 36 For example, a
drug on a higher (preferred) tier may be fully covered, with only a
minimal co-pay and no access restrictions. A drug on a lower tier may
be subject to a larger co-pay, prior-authorization requirements, or
step-therapy requirements (i.e., the requirement that other therapies
be tried before the beneficiary’s desired therapy is covered). For
example, excerpts from United Healthcare’s 2021 Drug List illustrate
the tiers it utilizes (Figure 1) and the access restrictions it imposes on
various drugs (Figure 2): 37
FIGURE 1. TIER INFORMATION
Drug
Tier

Includes

Helpful Tips

Tier 1 $

Lower-cost
Use Tier 1 drugs for the
Medications that provide the
lowest out-of-pocket
highest overall value. Mostly
costs.
generic drugs. Some brand-name
drugs may also be included.

Tier 2 $$ Mid-range cost
Medications that provide good
overall value. Mainly preferred
brand-name drugs.

Use Tier 2 drugs, instead
of Tier 3, to help reduce
your out-of-pocket costs.

Tier 3 $$$ Highest-cost
Medications that provide the
lowest overall value.

Ask your doctor if a Tier 1
or Tier 2 option could
work for you.

Using lower-tier medications can help you pay your lowest out-ofpocket cost. Your plan may have multiple or no tiers. Please note: If you
have a high deductible plan, the tier cost levels may apply once you hit
your deductible.

36. In the context of managed care,
[d]rug formularies attempt to encourage appropriate and high-value prescribing
through the use of a tiered structure, in which lower-cost medications are placed in
tiers with minimal cost sharing for patients. The purpose of a tiered structure is to
incent prescribers and health plan members to avoid higher cost medications. Higher
tiered (more costly) medications are a particular concern for health plans.
PARITYTRACK, supra note 31.
37. UNITED HEALTHCARE, YOUR 2021 PRESCRIPTION DRUG LIST 6 (2021), https://www.uhcsr.com
/common/pdfs/PDL-All.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2QG-9CBH]. Note that this is only part of the drug
list, and some portions of the list have been shortened.
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In Figure 2, overall value indicates medications’ effectiveness and
safety, cost, and the availability of alternative medications to treat the
same or similar medical condition(s).
FIGURE 2. PARTIAL DRUG LIST & KEY TO CONDITIONS

E

May be excluded from coverage or subject to Prior
Authorization in Connecticut, New Jersey and New York.
(Referred to as First Start in New Jersey.) – Lower-cost
options are available and covered.

H

Health Care Reform Preventative – This medication is part of
a health care reform preventative benefit and may be available
at no additional cost to you.

H-PA

Health Care Reform Preventative with Prior Authorization –
May be part of health care reform preventative and available at
no additional cost to you if prior authorization criteria met.

PA

Prior Authorization (sometimes referred to as
precertification) – Requires your doctor to provide
information about why you are taking a medication to
determine how it may be covered by your plan.

QL

Quantity Limits – Specifies the largest quantity of medication
covered per copayment or in a defined period of time.

RS

Refill and Save Program – Save money on your copayment
when you refill your prescription on time as prescribed.
Program eligibility may vary.

SP

Special Medication – Specialty medications treat complex or
rare conditions and may require special storage and handling.
You may be required to obtain these medications from a
specialty pharmacy.

ST

Step Therapy (referred to as First Start in New Jersey) –
Requires prior authorization and may require you to try one or
more other medications before the medication you are
requesting may be covered.
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Requirements
& Limits

Analgesics – Drugs for Pain
acetaminophen-codeine

1

apap-caff-dihydrocodeine

1

QL

BELBUCA

3

PA, QL

DILAUDID ORAL

3

DURAGESIC-100

E

PA, ST, QL

fentanyl transdermal patch 72
hour 100 mcg/hr, 12 mcg/hr, 25
mcg/hr, 50 mcg/hr, 75 mcg/hr

1

PA, QL

fentanyl transdermal patch 72
hour 37.5 mcg/hr, 62.5 mcg/hr,
87.5 mcg/hr

E

PA, ST, QL

hydrocodone-acetaminophen
oral tablet 10-300 mg, 5-300 mg,
7.5-300 mg

E

hydrocodone-acetaminophen
oral tablet 10-325 mg, 5-325 mg,
7.5-325 mg

1

hydromorphone hcl er

1

hydromorphone hcl oral

1

hydromorphone hcl rectal

1

HYSINGLA ER

E

PA, ST, QL

PA, ST, QL

The use of a formulary tiering system gives certain drugs
preferential treatment, thereby incentivizing patients to choose costsaving alternatives. Formularies also create another cost-savings
opportunity: the opportunity for price negotiation with pharmaceutical
manufacturers. 38 Formulary design is PBMs’ primary source of leverage
38. These rebates are substantial and often cover about fifty percent of the drug’s cost. For
example, one publication states that in 2019, manufacturers offered discounts of $315 billion out
of a total wholesale acquisition cost of $671 billion. IQVIA, MEDICINE SPENDING AND
AFFORDABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2020), https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs
/institute-reports/medicine-spending-and-affordability-in-the-united-states.pdf?_=1608764033660
[https://perma.cc/JZR7-CMWJ]. Of that $315 billion, $160 billion was attributable to supply
chain invoice discounts, $143 billion was attributable to rebates to payers, and $12 billion was
attributable to coupons. Id.
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to secure discounts and rebates. The threat of access restrictions on
even a single blockbuster product creates significant leverage for a PBM
to negotiate price concessions, which may relate to that drug or may
span any portion of a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s portfolio of
drugs. 39 PBMs can use several formulary-related tools to negotiate price
concessions. These tools have different impacts on formulary design
and different implications for beneficiaries.
For example, in exchange for price concessions, PBMs may simply
offer the manufacturer access to the formulary, which will result in
coverage of the drug once the formulary is adopted by the PBM’s clientplan. The PBM may go further and agree to specific formulary
placement—that is, to place a given drug on a higher tier than
competitor products, such that competitor drugs will be subject to more
onerous access restrictions. In either case, price concessions are often
made dependent on the achievement of purchase-volume targets for
specific drugs.
B. By Creating Coverage Barriers, Formularies Place Burdens on Beneficiaries
The primary goals of medicine are to alleviate morbidity and
mortality by providing patients with medically necessary care. Managed
care introduces another goal—cost containment, which it pursues
primarily through the use of utilization controls, such as copayments,
prior authorization requirements, and drug formularies that make
some drugs less accessible than others. 40 As with other utilization

39. See Adam J. Fein, The Big Three PBMs Ramp up Specialty Drug Exclusions for 2021, DRUG
CHANNELS (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.drugchannels.net/2021/01/the-big-three-pbms-ramp-upspecialty.html [https://perma.cc/HVX5-RRSH] (“Formulary exclusions have emerged as a powerful
tool for PBMs to gain additional negotiating leverage against manufacturers. The prospect of
exclusion leads manufacturers to offer deeper rebates to avoid being cut from the formulary.
Exclusions are a key factor behind the growing gap between list and net prices for brand-name
drugs.”).
40. Daniel Callahan, Managed Care and the Goals of Medicine, 46 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 385, 385
(1998).
The goals of medicine encompass the relief of pain and suffering, the
promotion of health and the prevention of disease, the forestalling of death
and the promoting of a peaceful death, and the cure of disease when possible
and the care of those who cannot be cured. Managed care, as a system of
integrated healthcare delivery designed to control costs, is not, in principle,
incompatible with the goals of medicine, but in practice it may well be,
depending on whether profit is sought, whether the integrity of physicians’
medical judgment is protected, and whether government regulations control
managed care practices to prevent abuse and to enhance the quality of care.
Id. There is also a tension between the plan’s obligation to minimize costs to its beneficiaries and
its desire to maximize profitability. Compare Negron v. Cigna Health & Life Ins., 300 F. Supp. 3d
341 (D. Conn. 2018) (involving allegations that plans artificially inflated prescription drug costs),
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control measures, formulary-imposed access restrictions on
prescription drugs are undeniably in tension with the provision of good
care because they inject financial considerations into what would
otherwise be a decision informed only by the best approach to
treatment. 41
To contain costs, most, if not all, formularies exclude some drugs,
such as “lifestyle drugs” (e.g., those for weight loss or sexual
enhancement) entirely, 42 making the excluded drugs available only if
the beneficiary pays for them out-of-pocket or has supplemental
coverage. Aside from simple coverage or non-coverage of drugs,
formularies also establish tiers, as described above, of preferred and
non-preferred covered drugs, each with a different set of access
restrictions. 43 The less preferred the tier, the more intense the access
restrictions and, hence, the potential for the greatest beneficiary
burden. These burdens can range from inconvenience (e.g., having to
wait for a drug to be mailed from a specialty pharmacy rather than
picking it up at the local drug store or having to wait a few days for
prior-authorization to clear) to significant detriment (e.g., raising outof-pocket costs to the point that a medically necessary drug is
effectively out of reach).
By way of example, we will consider three major burdens commonly
imposed as part of formulary design: (1) increased cost-sharing
obligations; (2) step therapy requirements; and (3) restrictions on access
to alternative therapies. All of these burdens must be recognized as
carrying the potential for real harm to beneficiaries in any analysis that
seeks to ensure that beneficiaries’ interests are protected.
In connection with this discussion, we make several public policybased distinctions that are essential to understanding the extant law.
We call price concessions that are offered merely to incentivize
coverage, “payments for access.” On the other hand, “payments for
placement” are price concessions contingent on (a) the placement of the
drug in a particular tier, (b) the exclusion or restriction of competitor
drugs, or (c) other elements of formulary design. Payments for access
create an impetus for formulary inclusion and perhaps even
preferential treatment over competitors, but still allow discretion in
formulary design. Payments for placement, on the other hand, require
that a given drug be given preferential treatment vis-à-vis competitor
products. As such, payments for placement usurp discretion by

with In re UnitedHealth Grp. PBM Litig., No. 16-cv-3352, 2017 WL 6512222 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2017)
(involving similar allegations that plans caused beneficiaries to overpay for prescription drugs).
41. See id.
42. What Drugs Are Excluded from Part D Plans?, MEDICARE.ORG, https://www.medicare.org
/articles/what-drugs-are-excluded-from-part-d-plans/ [https://perma.cc/X2NE-A5NW].
43. See, e.g., supra Figure 2.
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dictating formulary design and, as we discuss, have the potential to
result in higher costs for beneficiaries by making competitor products
harder to access.
We also distinguish between pre-sale discounts and post-sale
rebates. Because pre-sale discounts, by their very nature, reduce the list
price of the drug, the financial benefits of discounts are capable of
being, and often are, passed through to beneficiaries in the form of
reduced out-of-pocket costs (via reduced copayments or, if the
beneficiary is in the deductible phase of their policy, via reduced costs)
at the point of sale and, potentially, through reduced premiums from
plans who spend less money on drugs. 44 By contrast, post-sale rebates
do not reduce the list price of the drug, so financial benefits may not be
realized by the PBM until months after the point of sale, and may never
be realized at all by plans. As a result, it is not necessarily true that the
value of rebates will be passed through to beneficiaries. Our analysis
focuses, therefore, on these rebate arrangements.
1. Increased Cost-Sharing Obligations
Lower-tier drugs may be subject to substantially higher costsharing obligations than preferred drugs. It is not uncommon for costsharing obligations to be so high that the drugs are effectively noncovered, especially with respect to expensive specialty medications 45 of

44. There is evidence that the system of negotiated discounts has had the overall effect
of raising drug prices, creating higher ticket prices so as to allow pharmaceutical
manufacturers to discount prices for plans and PBMs without losing revenue. See Michael
Mandel, The ‘Prescription Escalator’ May Be to Blame for Rising Out-of-Pocket Drug Spending, STAT
NEWS (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/11/13/drug-spending-increase-formany-americans-prescription-escalator/ [https://perma.cc/G2GA-PQGF] (arguing that both
discounts and rebates contribute to overall increases in prescription drug prices). The
relationship between discounts and average list prices is, however, a topic for a different
article.
45. The term “specialty drug” generally refers to a “generic or brand name drug which may be
identified by an issuer of a health benefit policy as a high cost drug used to treat complex or rare
medical conditions.” H.B. 875, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016), https://www.legis.ga.gov
/legislation/47922 [https://perma.cc/2EDV-EG93]. Advocates for Responsible Care notes that
Studies have proven that shifting the [exorbitant] . . . cost of specialty medications onto
the beneficiary through the use of Specialty Tiers increases abandonment of
prescriptions, which can lead to serious adverse health outcomes. These adverse health
events also lead to higher health care and social service expenses due to lack of access to
treatment (i.e. emergency room visits, long term home care, permanent disability,
etc.). . . . According to a recent study by Avalere Health: . . . In seven classes, more than
20 percent of the plans require coinsurance of 40 percent or more for all medicines in
the class. Over 60 percent of the plans place all covered medicines in the class for
treating multiple sclerosis on the formulary tier with the highest cost sharing.
Similarly, over 60 percent of the plans place all covered medicines in certain classes for
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which plans want to discourage use. As a result, the high cost of the
drugs puts them out of reach of some beneficiaries. 46 Indeed, if the
intended effect of higher cost-sharing obligations is to create an
economic incentive that steers patients away from formulary-nonpreferred therapies, to be successful such obligations would have to be
substantial enough to materially affect patient decision-making. High
cost-sharing obligations may, therefore, result not only in a choice to
use a formulary-non-preferred drug, but also in a decision to forgo
therapy. 47
2. Step Therapy Requirements
Step therapy requires that beneficiaries try formulary-preferred
medications before a non-preferred medication will be covered. 48 Step
therapy regimes may require a prolonged period (e.g., two years) of

treating cancer on the formulary tier with the highest cost sharing. Almost all plans
(86%) place all medicines in at least one class on the highest cost-sharing tier.
Specialty Tiers Legislation, ADVOCS. FOR RESP. CARE, http://www.advocatesforresponsiblecare.org
/what-we-are-about/specialty-tiers-legislation [https://perma.cc/D7J7-8K9M] (citations omitted).
46. For example, a large PBM, Express Scripts,
found that in 2004, among patients taking specialty drugs [which are normally placed
in a higher tier] for multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, and hepatitis C, specialty
pharmacy accounted for 17 percent of their total prescription consumption, but 80
percent of their total annual drug cost. Looked at another way, the average cost of a
specialty drug for those ailments was $12,563, but just $3,329 for conventional
medications.
Ed Silverman, Copayments: Too Much, Yet Not Enough?, 2006 BIOTECH. HEALTHCARE 21, 25, https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3571026/ [https://perma.cc/5KDK-UWV4].
47. See id. at 22 (explaining that research indicates that even relatively low copayments can
act as a deterrence to use a drug); see also Rahul Shenolikar, Amanda Schofield Bruno, Michael
Eaddy & Christopher Cantrell, Sensitivity of Medication Use to Formulary Controls in Medicare
Beneficiaries: A Review of the Literature, 4 AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 465, 466 (2011), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4106498/ [https://perma.cc/RA5K-UHZU] (“[T]he evidence
shows that more restrictive drug coverage is associated with reduced medication use among
Medicare beneficiaries, and fewer restrictions encourage enhanced medication use.”). This failure
can have substantial impacts on health. See Sendhil Mullainathan, When a Co-Pay Gets in the Way of
Health, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/business/when-a-co-paygets-in-the-way-of-health.html [https://perma.cc/7B9X-LZ98] (describing a study in which people
with copays were less likely to utilize medication for the same conditions as those whose copays
were waived, and as a result suffered more adverse health consequences).
48. See Step Therapy, PRESCRIPTION PROCESS, http://prescriptionprocess.com/barriers-to-access
/step-therapy/ [https://perma.cc/4L6L-FCCV] (“Step therapy, also known as ‘fail first,’ is a process
used by health insurers to control costs. It requires patients to try one or more medications
specified by the insurance company, typically a generic or lower cost medicine, to treat a health
condition. Patients must then fail on the medication(s) before allowing a ‘step up’ to another
medicine that may be more expensive for the insurer.”).
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alternative therapy before a non-preferred therapy is covered. 49 The
cost of step therapy for beneficiaries is more than nuisance or delay. In
addition to the costs associated with more doctor’s appointments, 50
step therapy may increase out-of-pocket costs for beneficiaries by
requiring that beneficiaries pay for months (or even years) of
additional, less effective therapies before they can access a therapy that
works. Moreover, step therapy may delay access to effective therapy
until it is too late, allowing health conditions to worsen, sometimes
irreversibly, during the course of the less effective alternative
therapies. 51 Because many people switch insurance plans from year to
year, step therapy may also effectively keep patients from ever
accessing effective therapies. A patient who is subject to two years of
step therapy may, for example, switch insurance plans one-and-a-half
years into step therapy. The patient may have to start step therapy from
scratch with the new insurer, or face the substantial administrative
burden of collecting paperwork and proving to the new plan that step
therapy has been underway. 52 Even where beneficiaries stay on the
same insurance plan, the requirement that the beneficiary fail
treatment on a preferred drug to gain coverage for a nonpreferred drug
may be triggered not only at the onset of therapy, but every year, as
drugs cycle on and off the formulary. For example, a patient may be
successfully using one asthma inhalant, but if that inhalant is moved to
a non-preferred tier, the patient may be required to fail a trial of the

49. See, e.g., Limiting Step Therapy Policies to Protect Patients, CAL. RHEUMATOLOGY ALL., https://
cqrcengage.com/cra/steptherapy [https://perma.cc/MJN7-CPPG].
50. See, e.g., Step Therapy: The Patient Impact, PRESCRIPTION PROCESS, http://
prescriptionprocess.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Step-Therapy-The-Patient-Impact.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PL8G-SQH4] (describing a Georgia Medicaid study in which step-therapy
“saved” the state $19.62 per member per month on schizophrenia medications, but the savings
were accompanied by $31.59 per member per month increase for outpatient services, thereby
implying that restrictions on access resulted in poorer health).
51. See, e.g., Adrienne Chung, Joanna MacEwan & Dana P. Goldman, Does a ‘One-Size-Fits-All’
Formulary Policy Make Sense?, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG: HEALTH EQUITY (June 2, 2016), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160602.055116/full/ [https://perma.cc/ZTG9-N35Z] (“‘Failfirst’ policies, as their name suggests, increase the risk of dangerous side effects[.] For certain
patients—like those who need immunologic and biologic agents—these concerns are particularly
salient. Researchers found that 18 insurance plans—representing approximately 97 million insured
lives—required 45 percent of beneficiaries to ‘step through’ one or two drugs bearing an FDA ‘black
box warning’ of serious adverse events before progressing to a drug without such warning. As a
result, patients may needlessly face severe health risks in disease areas that have benefited from
recent advances in immunologic and biologic therapy, such as cancer and inflammatory diseases.”).
52. See, e.g., Step Therapy, ARTHRITIS FOUND., https://www.arthritis.org/advocate/issue-briefs
/step-therapy [https://perma.cc/Z85P-WJJE] (“A survey of more than 1,400 patients conducted in
2016 by the Arthritis Foundation revealed that over half of all patients reported having to try two or
more different drugs prior to getting the one their doctor had originally ordered. Step therapy was
stopped in 39 percent of cases because the drugs were ineffective, and 20 percent of the time due to
worsening conditions. Incredibly, nearly a quarter of patients who switched insurance providers
were required to repeat step therapy with their new carrier.”).
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preferred drug before again becoming eligible for coverage of the
original inhalant.
3. Restrictions on Access to Therapeutic Alternatives
Where two or more drugs are therapeutically equivalent, it is not
uncommon for one drug to be on-formulary or preferred, while
alternatives are not covered 53 or are placed on lower tiers. In its most
straightforward form, this occurs when a generic drug is cheaper than a
branded drug. The PBM may include the generic drug on-formulary,
while excluding or placing at a lower tier the branded drug, therefore
incentivizing patients to choose the generic drug. This dynamic gets
distorted, however, when the PBM can profit from preferring the
higher-cost brand drug. For example, manufacturers may offer the
PBM a lucrative rebate or other payment for placement to induce
inclusion of the more expensive drug in a higher tier; or, the PBM may
also profit when negotiations between the PBM and manufacturer
occur across a manufacturer’s entire portfolio of products. 54 In such a
scenario, the PBM may agree to place access restrictions on (or not even
cover) lower cost alternatives to a competitor drug in order to secure
discounts, rebates, or other concessions on the expensive drug or on
other drugs in the manufacturer’s portfolio.
Unequal treatment of therapeutically-equivalent drugs on
formularies has several implications for beneficiaries. Where a
pharmacy only stocks one alternative, for example, a beneficiary may
find that her local pharmacy does not stock the drug covered. Normally,
a pharmacy would simply work with the beneficiary’s healthcare
provider to substitute the equivalent medication that is in stock. But if
the stocked medication is off-formulary or subject to access
restrictions, the formulary may prevent the pharmacy from doing so
without significant cost to the beneficiary. Such a scenario may cause
the patient inconvenience and delay in obtaining therapy at a time
when the patient is under considerable illness-induced stress.
The exclusion of drugs from a formulary when there is no
therapeutically-equivalent drug is more clearly problematic as it has the
potential to stop patients from receiving a therapeutically beneficial
drug. For example, formularies may exclude an expensive drug such as

53. See, e.g., 2021 National Preferred Formulary Exclusions, EXPRESS SCRIPTS (2021), https://
www.express-scripts.com/art/pdf/NPF_Preferred_Formulary_Exclusions2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XA6-YQLU]; Ipsita Smolinski, Special Formulary Exclusions Gaining Traction,
MORNING CONSULT (Jan. 6, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://morningconsult.com/opinions/specialtyformulary-exclusions-gaining-traction/ [https://perma.cc/SP3H-ZA3X].
54. See infra Part III for further discussion of this dynamic.
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sofosbuvir for hepatitis C because it sells for about $1,000 per tablet. 55
Patients will be harmed by this exclusion if there is no drug with similar
efficacy included in the formulary; or if, as compared to excluded
drugs, included drugs have more profound side effects; or if the regime
is longer or the drug more difficult to administer. 56
Tiering can be designed to encourage utilization of lower-priced
alternatives (e.g., generics vs. brands), as well as to discourage the use
of higher priced drugs even where there is no alternative available. 57
Where tiering is deployed, access restrictions such as onerous priorauthorization requirements, step-therapy, and high copayments may
put the most effective therapy out of reach for many beneficiaries,
leaving beneficiaries with only second-best therapeutic options.
Access restrictions often result in the exclusion of competitors who
could offer a cheaper price to patients, and these restrictions may also
lead to increased beneficiary costs. 58 A common example of this
phenomenon occurs when preferential treatment is given to brandname drugs. In such cases, patients may not have access to a cheaper
generic or biosimilar drug because only the brand drug is covered.
Where patients have cost-sharing obligations such as copayments and
deductibles, restricted access to generic and biosimilar drugs may
substantially increase beneficiary out-of-pocket costs—for preferential
treatment of a drug that is therapeutically indistinguishable from its
generic competitors. As one commentator notes, discussing insulin:
Studies have revealed that pharmaceutical companies give
pharmacy benefits managers (PBMs) volume-based rebases
[sic] in exchange for keeping competing generic/biosimilar
competitors off the formulary. A study found that only 17
percent of Medicare plans for seniors covered Basaglar, a
55. See F. Randy Vogenberg & Judith Gomes, The Changing Roles of P&T Committees: A Look Back
at the Last Decade and a Look Forward to 2020, 39 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 760 (2014),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4218672/ [https://perma.cc/4WPC-8MAE].
56. This could happen with hepatitis C drugs, for example, as “[t]here is a range of different
medications for hepatitis C because there is no single drug that works for everyone” and these
drugs have different therapeutic implications, including length of treatment and side effects of a
number of drugs used to treat hepatitis C.” Jon Johnson, What Are the Best Hepatitis C Drugs?,
MEDICAL NEWS TODAY (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/324209 [https://
perma.cc/SE9C-DQ2N].
57. See Improving Value: Drug Formulary Design, ALTARUM HEALTHCARE VALUE HUB, https://
www.healthcarevaluehub.org/improving-value/browse-strategy/drug-formulary-design [https://
perma.cc/KX93-4SVB] (“Tiered formularies divide covered medications into groups, usually based
on cost. Insurers use these categories to encourage enrollees to opt for cheaper generic or brandname drugs instead of higher cost alternatives.”).
58. See, e.g., Jay Hancock & Sydney Lupkin, Secretive ‘Rebate Trap’ Keeps Generic Drugs for
Diabetes and Other Ills out of Reach, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 18, 2019), https://khn.org/news
/secretive-rebate-trap-keeps-generic-drugs-for-diabetes-and-other-ills-out-of-reach/ [https://
perma.cc/A94X-RCCX].
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biosimilar drug, although nearly all plans covered Sanofi’s more
expensive biologic drug Lantus (Basaglar’s originator). 59
Another study found that only nineteen percent of generic drugs
covered by Medicare Part D were in formulary tiers that imposed the
lowest out-of-pocket costs on beneficiaries. 60
Formulary restrictions on access to lower priced drugs is costly in
another way: it may push Medicare Part D beneficiaries into a coverage
“doughnut hole” between the maximum amount of standard drug
coverage that a plan offers and the point at which catastrophic coverage
kicks in. For Medicare Part D beneficiaries, drug benefits change once
the plan has spent approximately $4,000 on a beneficiary in a given
year. 61 At that point, a new scheme begins, and the beneficiary is
responsible for a higher proportion of the beneficiary’s prescription
drug costs. 62 This new coverage scheme, which is substantially more
costly to the beneficiary, continues until the beneficiary has spent
approximately $6,000 of their own money out-of-pocket. 63 At that
point, catastrophic coverage kicks in. 64 Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) explained the impact of higher cost drugs on
beneficiary out-of-pocket costs vis-à-vis the doughnut hole:
[T]he list prices also play an important role in a beneficiary’s
progression through the different phases of the Part D benefit;
higher list prices mean quicker progression through the benefit
and higher overall costs in the catastrophic phase once the
beneficiary reaches it. Rebates and other price concessions
received after the point-of-sale do not mitigate these impacts. 65

59. Improving Value: Drug Formulary Design, supra note 57.
60. Chris Sloan & Elizabeth Carpenter, Seniors Pay More for Medicare Part D Generics Despite
Stable Prices, AVALERE (May 22, 2018), https://avalere.com/press-releases/seniors-pay-more-forgenerics-in-medicare-prescription-drug-plans-despite-stable-prices [https://perma.cc/E62X-9MNA]
(assessing a period between 2011 and 2015). Along the same lines: “Brand-drug sellers ‘pay for
position’ on the formulary, said Michael Rea, CEO of Rx Savings Solutions, which helps health
plans and employers manage pharma costs. ‘In this country, the most cost-effective drugs don’t
necessarily mean anyone will have access to them . . . [Companies with] the deepest pockets win.’”
Hancock & Lupkin, supra note 58.
61. See Costs in the Coverage Gap, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/drug-coveragepart-d/costs-for-medicare-drug-coverage/costs-in-the-coverage-gap [https://perma.cc/PKU7-UQ58].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Catastrophic Coverage, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/drug-coveragepart-d/costs-for-medicare-drug-coverage/catastrophic-coverage [https://perma.cc/89MT-WC68].
65. Medicare Part D – Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/medicare-part-d-direct-andindirect-remuneration-dir [https://perma.cc/WJ96-5BT5].
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Access restrictions that drive beneficiaries toward higher-priced
drugs may increase costs for beneficiaries in a number of ways.
Beneficiary copayments may increase, especially where copayment
obligations are calculated as a percentage of a drug’s list price.
Beneficiaries who have not yet met their deductible, moreover, may be
responsible for the entire list price of the drug. A higher list price may
also push beneficiaries into coverage doughnut holes where they have
hit their standard coverage cap, but have not yet met the out-of-pocket
amount necessary for catastrophic coverage to kick in.
In sum, as a part of negotiations with manufacturers, PBMs may
agree to restrict access to more or equally effective therapies to secure
price concessions that benefit the PBM and sometimes the plans they
work for, but often not the beneficiaries who purchase the drugs.
Access restrictions may operate to the clinical and financial detriment
of patients who have been prescribed restricted drugs. There are, of
course, at least some circumstances in which restricting access to
competitive drugs may result in price reductions that are passed
through to beneficiaries. As the next Section discusses, however, under
certain circumstances, and especially in the context of rebates,
payment-for-placement arrangements may operate exclusively to the
detriment of beneficiaries.
C. Access Restrictions May Not Benefit Plan Members
Even though beneficiaries clearly bear the cost of access
restrictions, they do not always benefit from them. 66 By aggregating the
buying power of their client plans and using formulary design to
concentrate purchasing volume, PBMs can extract deeper price
concessions than can their clients acting independently. 67 As a district
court recently explained:
[M]anufacturers
contract
with
PBMs
to
pay
“rebates”. . . directly attributable to the plan’s use of “preferred”

66. See, e.g., The PBM Problem: Consumers Face an Unfair Disadvantage at the Pharmacy Counter,
NAT’L CONSUMERS LEAGUE, https://nclnet.org/pbms [https://perma.cc/J7R8-FY8C] (“PBMs impede
the savings that should be going to consumers in many ways. PBMs often demand that drug
companies provide them ‘rebates’ or discounts to offer medicines as part of a drug benefit plan.
These discounts are meant to lower the out-of-pocket costs consumers pay at the pharmacy
counter, but we aren’t seeing the savings. PBMs also steer consumers to the higher-cost drugs that
will make them the most money, regardless of patient and treatment considerations.”).
67. See John Arnold, Are Pharmacy Benefit Managers the Good Guys or Bad Guys of Drug Pricing?,
STAT (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/27/pharmacy-benefit-managers-goodor-bad/ [https://perma.cc/5U2U-JA3H].
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formulary pharmaceuticals. . . . [R]ebates are owed, and
directly paid, to the PBMs.
Oftentimes, PBMs develop proprietary formularies,
irrespective of the plans with which they deal; in other cases,
plans participate in selecting certain criteria or identifying
specific drugs for inclusion (and/or exclusion). . . . Where the
plan participates in a formulary program, PBMs are often paid
an additional amount, e.g., a portion of market share rebates,
for their performance of services related to encouraging
pharmacies, physicians, and members to participate in and/or
facilitate the same. 68
Because PBMs often retain a portion of rebates as payment for their
services, PBMs have an incentive to maximize rebates.
A rebate is a partial refund of a purchase price, made after the sale
of the subject item. As such, the rebates secured by PBMs are not
reflected in a drug’s list price, but rather are paid retrospectively after
the time of sale. 69 Therefore, rebates may not flow through to
beneficiaries in the form of lower cost-sharing obligations. Indeed,
CMS has observed that, while manufacturer payments to PBMs as a
proportion of drug cost trended dramatically upwards during a recent
five-year period, these payments have not resulted in a proportionate
reduction in the price assessed at the point-of-service. 70 As beneficiary
cost-sharing obligations are often assessed as a percentage of the pointof-service price, any reduction in drug cost that is not reflected at the
point-of-service will not result in a reduction of the beneficiary’s costsharing obligation. 71 Everson v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ohio includes
a discussion of how a discount or rebate may benefit a payor but not
result in a reduction in copayments. 72 The Everson plaintiffbeneficiaries alleged the defendant-group health plan had caused them
to make copayments in excess of the fixed percentage set forth
in the group plan. Plaintiffs claim that the excess payments are
68. In re Express Scripts, Inc., PBM Litig., No. 05-MD-01672, 2008 WL 2952787, at *5–6 (E.D.
Mo. July 30, 2008). For a good explanation of how PBMs retain a portion of the discounts that they
receive from pharmacies (i.e., the “spread”), see Qui Tam Complaint, United States ex rel. Behnke
v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 14-cv-824, 2020 WL 1953626 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2020).
69. Deana K. Bell & Karen L. Nixon, Rebates at the Point of Sale, ACTUARY (May 2020),
https://theactuarymagazine.org/rebates-at-the-point-of-sale/ [https://perma.cc/A6S2-5VH6].
70. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 19-498, MEDICARE PART D: USE OF
PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS AND EFFORTS TO MANAGE DRUG EXPENDITURES AND UTILIZATION (2019),
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents
/Medicare%20Part%20D%20GAO%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW5X-LN2U].
71. See id.
72. Everson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 898 F. Supp. 532, 536 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
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the result of the allegedly undisclosed practice of defendant
negotiating discounts with health care providers and failing to
pass a proportionate share of such discounts on to its insureds.
As a result, plaintiffs allege that defendant actually pays a
percentage of the health care providers’ charges which is less
than that specified by the terms of the plan. The insureds’ portion,
on the other hand, is not discounted, but is still based on the total
charges. Thus, the copayment paid by the insured is greater than that
specified by the terms of the plan. 73
Even if rebates do not reduce drug prices at the point-of-service,
one might expect that rebates would benefit plans and, ultimately,
beneficiaries, in the form of lower premium costs. However, this is not
always the case. PBMs do not usually pass rebates through in their
entirety—or even at all—to plans, and plans do not always pass through
any cost savings they do realize to beneficiaries. 74 All of this means that
the PBM’s opportunity to profit from formulary design decisions,
including attendant access restrictions, often does not correlate with
benefits to beneficiaries in the form of reduced costs or improved
access to care.
The incentives that rebate arrangements create for PBMs can be at
odds with the incentives plans have to minimize plan costs, particularly
when the rebate is a payment for placement. Rebate arrangements can
result in higher costs, which in turn result in higher premiums and,
even when they do not, can result in higher copayments 75 or other costsharing obligations for beneficiaries. 76 Rebates may also cause clinical
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. See, e.g., Dae Y. Lee & Jonathon E. Levitt, Understanding the Truth About PBMs and
Manufacturer Rebate Revenue, FRIER LEVITT (June 22, 2020), https://www.frierlevitt.com/articles
/understand-the-truth-about-pbms-and-manufacturer-rebate-revenue/ [https://perma.cc/3RS97GFA].
75. Notably, to the extent that discounts are extended via rebates and not via point-of-service
price reductions, beneficiaries whose copayment obligations are calculated as a percentage of price
will not benefit from the rebates through copayment reduction. On the other hand, to the extent
that copayments are flat amounts determined by the tier in which the drug is placed, preferential
treatment can reduce drug costs. In either case, “tier placement remains a key determinant of
consumer cost.” See Charles Roehrig, Rebates, Coupons, PBMs, and the Cost of the Prescription Drug
Benefit, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377
/hblog20180424.17957/full/ [https://perma.cc/6L7R-R9QP].
76. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 70, at 13. Consider the following:
Rebates and other price concessions reduce the cost of the Part D program to
beneficiaries and the federal government. In developing their bids, Part D
plan sponsors may subtract rebates and other price concessions that are
passed along to them from their estimated drug costs. When they do,
rebates and other price concessions reduce a plan sponsor’s estimate of
liability that is reflected in bid amounts, which, in turn, reduce beneficiary
premiums because they are partially based on the bid amount. This
downward pressure on premiums is one reason that premiums remained
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or other benefits of competing drugs to be eclipsed in the formulary
design process. 77 As a result, the PBM’s guiding light is not a careful
consideration of healthcare and cost outcomes for beneficiaries, but
rather the ultimate profitability to the PBM of the placement decision,
which may be entirely divorced from (if not adverse to) beneficiary
interests. The opportunity of a PBM to profit from limiting drug access
is fundamentally at odds with patient clinical and economic wellbeing.
When PBMs accept and retain rebates in lieu of pre-sale discounts or
other price concessions that are passed through to beneficiaries, and
when PBMs agree to lift utilization controls from one drug but then
apply them to others in exchange for a payment for placement, the
interests of PBMs, patients, and plans diverge. In this system, rather
than acting in the interest of cost-containment through benefit
administration, PBMs become rent-seeking, third-party intermediaries
whose involvement is primarily one of economic friction—driving up
costs for beneficiaries (in terms of dollars, time, or clinical outcome) so
as to collect a reward merely for their presence in the pharmaceutical
distribution and payment system.
II. PHARMACY & THERAPEUTIC COMMITTEES PLAY A LIMITED ROLE IN
PROTECTING BENEFICIARY INTERESTS
In theory, where the interests of PBMs and beneficiaries diverge,
the interests of beneficiaries should be accounted for in the formulary
design process through the use of P&T committees. 78 P&T committees
are comprised of clinical professionals (such as physicians and
pharmacists) and other persons with expertise in healthcare, public
relatively unchanged between 2010 and 2015, according to CMS, even though
total gross Part D drug costs grew about twelve percent per year in that
period. Rebates have additional implications for Part D beneficiaries and the
Part D program more generally. Since beneficiary cost sharing is calculated
based on the price of the drug at the time of purchase (i.e., before rebates are
paid), beneficiaries pay higher cost sharing than they would if rebates were
paid at the point of sale. In addition, higher pre-rebate drug prices may
result in beneficiaries more quickly reaching the catastrophic coverage
phase, where the federal government’s share of drug costs increases and the
plan sponsors’ share decreases.
Id.
77. See, e.g., Rachel Cohrs, Without Rebates, Evidence Could Be Key for Formulary Placement,
INSIDE HEALTH POL’Y (Apr. 18, 2019), https://insidehealthpolicy.com/inside-drug-pricing-daily-news
/without-rebates-evidence-could-be-key-formulary-placement
[https://perma.cc/HS3L-CTPX].
Eliminating rebates “could force drug companies to compete more directly on value” and “require a
shift in strategy toward more robust evidence generation, the development of support services,
and greater competition in value-based contracts.” Id. (citing and quoting Deloitte executive Greg
Reh). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 70, at 13.
78. The use of P&T committees to protect beneficiary interests is broadly acknowledged and
is often required by law. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 423.120(b)(1) (2020).
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health, and benefits design. 79 These committees are tasked with
assessing available therapeutic options and advising on formulary
design. 80 Because P&T committees are intended to serve as a check on
self-interested decision-making by PBMs, they function with some
amount of independence from the PBMs they advise. 81 Indeed, in many
contexts, P&T committees are required to have a certain number of
members that are free of any conflict of interest that may cause them to
prioritize PBM or plan preference over the interests of beneficiaries in
receiving safe and effective therapy. 82 P&T committee members who
are clinical professionals, moreover, must act in a manner that is
79. See id. (requiring that a majority of members of any Part D P&T committee be practicing
physicians or pharmacists); see also Formulary Management, ACAD. OF MANAGED CARE PHARMACY
(Nov. 2009), https://amcp.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/Formulary%20Management.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y2TU-VQHQ] (“The P&T committee is responsible for developing, managing, updating
and administering the formulary. The P&T committee also designs and implements formulary
system policies on utilization and access to medications. Utilization management strategies such
as quantity limits, step therapy and prior authorization criteria may be reviewed and approved by
P&T committees. Access policies include medical exception process protocols to allow patients
coverage for non-formulary drugs under defined circumstances.”).
80. The role of P&T committees in assessing the safety, efficacy, and public health
implications of drugs is taken very seriously, with potentially severe penalties for fraudulent
actions that damage the integrity of the P&T committee’s review. For example, in 2020, Shaun
Thaxter, a former executive at a pharmaceutical company, Indivior, was criminally convicted for
providing false information to Massachusetts Medicaid (“MassHealth”) regarding Indivior’s drug
for the treatment of opioid dependence, Suboxone Film. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S.
Att’y’s Off., W. Dist. Va., Suboxone Manufacturer Indivior’s Former Chief Executive Officer
Sentenced to Jail Time in Connection with Drug Safety Claims (Oct. 22, 2020), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-wdva/pr/suboxone-manufacturer-indiviors-former-chief-executive-officersentenced-jail-time [https://perma.cc/P9SQ-L3LJ]. The Department of Justice’s press release noted
that:
Thaxter oversaw and encouraged Indivior’s efforts to secure formulary coverage for
Suboxone Film from . . . MassHealth. Thaxter asked Indivior employees . . . to devise a
strategy to win preferred drug status for Suboxone Film and counteract a non-opioid
competitor MassHealth was considering for opioid-addiction treatment. Certain
Indivior employees subsequently shared false and misleading safety information with
MassHealth officials about Suboxone Film’s risk of accidental pediatric exposure. Two
months after receiving that false and misleading information, MassHealth announced it
would provide access to Suboxone Film for Medicaid patients with children under the
age of six.
Id.
81. See, e.g., Stephen Barlas, P&T Committees Face New Medicare Rules: Proof Needed of
“Independent” Members’ Independence, PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS (May 2015), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4422628/ [https://perma.cc/L4H4-SKPY].
82. Under the Affordable Care Act, plans offered on Affordable Care Act marketplaces must
employ the services of a P&T committee, at least twenty percent of members of which must have
no conflicts of interest with the issuer of the plan or any pharmaceutical manufacturer. 45 C.F.R. §
156.122(a)(3)(i)(D) (2020). Those members who do have a conflict of interest are prohibited from
voting on any matters for which the conflict exists. 45 C.F.R. § 156.122(a)(3)(i). Likewise,
regulations governing the administration of Medicare Part D plans require that P&T committee
members be free from conflicts of interest. 45 C.F.R. § 156.122(a)(3)(i)(C) (“The P&T committee
must: . . . Prohibit any member with a conflict of interest with respect to the issuer or a
pharmaceutical manufacturer from voting on any matters for which the conflict exists.”).
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consistent with their status as licensed medical professionals, under
rules that are dictated by state laws, state professional licensing boards,
and non-government professional associations. These rules—which
apply not only when such professionals are treating individual patients,
but also any time such professionals act in their capacity as licensed
clinical professionals 83—include standards that broadly require that
physicians and pharmacists act only in the best interests of patients,
making decisions free from conflict of interest or undue influence. 84
Despite the generally-accepted role of P&T committees, there is no
standard approach to assuring that P&T committees engage in a robust
cost-benefit analysis from a beneficiary’s perspective, meaning that the
role of P&T committees has been mostly limited to advising on the
comparative safety and therapeutic value of available drugs without
consideration for the broader, pharmacoeconomic implications of
formulary design. 85 In many cases, P&T committees are explicitly
83. Several state medical boards have taken disciplinary action against physicians for actions
taken as agents of insurance providers (as opposed to the role of direct care provider). In Murphy v.
Board of Medical Examiners of State of Arizona, the Court of Appeals of Arizona concluded that the
Arizona State Medical Board did have jurisdiction to discipline a physician for actions taken in his
role as a plan Medical Director. Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs of the State of Ariz., 949 P.2d 530,
532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). The court explained that the duty of the Board, by statute, is broadly “to
protect the public from unlawful, incompetent, unqualified, impaired or unprofessional
practitioners.” Id. at 535–36. The Missouri Supreme Court has likewise found insurance plan
Medical Directors to be acting in their professional capacity when making decisions that are
determinative of insurance coverage. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Fallon, 41
S.W.3d 474, 477 (Mo. 2001). The court explained that although “the choice to cover a patient’s
expenses is an administrative choice, a physician’s finding of ‘medical necessity’ is a purely medical
decision.” Id. at 477; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES, PROCEEDINGS: 148TH ANNUAL
MEETING 267, 268–69 (1999). The proceedings explain that physicians are obligated to place the
interests of patients above the financial interests of their employers and that “[p]hysicians must
uphold their professional, ethical duties regardless of whether they are engaged in direct patient
care or in clinical decision-making that affects patient care provided by another physician or
licensed health care professional.” AM. MED. ASS’N, supra, at 268.
84. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 147.091 (2021) (allowing the state medical board to take disciplinary
action against physicians who fail to uphold certain standards of conduct); Code of Ethics for
Pharmacists, AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N (Oct. 27, 1994), https://www.ashp.org/-/media/assets/policyguidelines/docs/endorsed-documents/code-of-ethics-for-pharmacists.ashx [https://perma.cc
/9AMN-SYDH] (“[A] pharmacist promises to help individuals achieve optimum benefit from their
medications, to be committed to their welfare, and to maintain their trust. . . . A pharmacist
avoids discriminatory practices, behavior or work conditions that impair professional judgment,
and actions that compromise dedication to the best interests of patients.”); AMA Principles of Medical
Ethics, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/about/publications-newsletters/ama-principlesmedical-ethics [https://perma.cc/4SH7-EDAP] (“As a member of this profession, a physician must
recognize responsibility to patients first and foremost, as well as to society, to other health
professionals, and to self. . . . A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to
the patient as paramount. . . . A physician shall support access to medical care for all people.”).
85. An analysis of P&T committees in England described a similar lack of defined analytical
process for P&T committees, despite the crucial role played by P&T committees in the continuum
of care:
[L]ocal formulary committees are key players in the management of scarce resources.
However, little is known about the information and processes used when making
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limited by their mandates to consider only the relative safety and
efficacy of drugs. 86 Where P&T committee mandates instruct the P&T
committee to conduct a more holistic, pharmacoeconomic analysis that
accounts for costs to beneficiaries, the resulting analysis may be limited
to simple comparisons of list price between therapeutic equivalents or
may explicitly be made subordinate to considerations of cost to the
plan. 87 More fundamentally, even if P&T committees function entirely
decisions on the inclusion of new treatments. This paper reports research on the use of
economic evaluations in technology coverage decisions in England, although the
findings have a relevance to other health care systems with devolved responsibility for
resource allocation. . . . Our main research finding is that it is an exception for costeffectiveness analysis to inform technology coverage decisions. Barriers to use include
access and expertise levels, concerns relating to the independence of analyses and
problems with implementation of study recommendations. Further barriers derive
from the constraints on decision makers, a lack of clarity over functions and aims of
local committees, and the challenge of disinvestment in medical technologies. The
relative weakness of the research-practice dynamics in this context suggests the need
for a rethinking of the role of both analysts and decision makers. Our research supports
the view that in order to be useful, analysis needs to better reflect the constraints of the
local decision-making environment. We also recommend that . . . the National Health
Service more clearly identify the ‘problems’ which they are charged with solving and
how their outputs contribute to broader finance and commissioning functions. This
would help to establish the ways in which the routine use of cost-effectiveness analysis
might become a reality.
Iestyn P. Williams & Stirling Bryan, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Formulary Decision Making in
England: Findings from Research, 65 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2117, 2117 (2007), https://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953607003450?via%3Dihub; see also Zhixiao
Wang, J. Warren Salmon & Surrey M. Walton, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and the Formulary DecisionMaking Process, 10 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 48 (2003) (explaining that use of cost-effectiveness
analysis for formulary decision-making is limited by current methodological concerns).
86. For example, Washington State’s Medical Assistance P&T Committee is limited to
evaluating “available evidence regarding the relative safety, efficacy, and effectiveness of
prescription drugs within a class or classes of prescription drugs and to making
recommendations . . . for . . . the development of the state’s preferred drug list.” P&T Committee
Plan of Operations, WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., https://www.hca.wa.gov/assets/program/ptplan-of-operations.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD8L-UZC2]. Such review may include “outcome studies
of the long-term effects of drugs” and drug utilization review. Id.
87. For example, HealthPartners, a managed care plan, states that the mission of the
ƦŭĀŸܟƱܶ ¦ ܶ¿ދĝƂŶŶŔƿƿīīܶ ŔƱܶ ܜƿƂܶ ƦƩƂŶƂƿīܶ ƿŎīܶ ĀƦƦƩƂƦƩŔĀƿīܶ ǇƱīܶ ƂŅܶ ŎŔņŎܶ ƨǇĀŭŔƿǪܶ ĀŸĤܶ ĝƂƱƿܒīŅŅīĝƿŔǣīܶ
pharmaceuticals for [plan] members.” HEALTHPARTNERS, PHARMACY AND THERAPEUTICS
COMMITTEE P OLICIES AND PROCEDURES 2 (2021), https://www.healthpartners.com/ucm/groups
/public/@hp/@public/documents/documents/cntrb_043361.pdf [https://perma.cc/283L-9VCB]
(emphasis added). This policy explicitly acknowledges beneficiary interests, stating that the
committee is to be guided by these competing principles: effectiveness, safety,
pharmacoeconomics, emphasis on products essential to health, patient adherence, convenience,
patient satisfaction relative to such issues as storage and dosing convenience, and supporting
standard treatment protocols. Id. at 3. The HealthPartners policy says that it will consider:
“Significant improvements in patient convenience, adherence, and satisfaction. We will review
more favorably products that have significant improvements in patient convenience, adherence,
and satisfaction. Examples include variables such as dosing convenience, variety of dosage forms,
taste, ability to crush or divide doses, and storage requirements (refrigeration).” Id. However, the
policy instructs that “[t]hese principles are prioritized in descending order,” such that
considerations of cost to the plan will always supersede considerations of patient convenience. Id.
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independently of plan and PBM interests, fully accounting for
beneficiary interests in their analysis, PBMs and plans are not bound by
the recommendations of P&T committees; this means that PBMs and
plans can and do simply disregard P&T committee recommendations
that may increase PBM costs or decrease PBM revenues. 88
As an illustration of both how beneficiary costs may be overlooked
and how PBM consideration of profitability infects formulary design,
we take a brief look at the formulary design of Express Scripts, a PBM
that services about a quarter of the market. 89 Express Scripts explains

TRICARE, the Department of Defense managed care healthcare program, mandates the use
of a P&T committee, which is explicitly charged with considering costs when making formulary
design recommendations. 10 U.S.C. § 1074g(a)(2)(A); 32 C.F.R. § 199.21(e)(1)–(2) (2020). The only
costs that it is mandated to consider are the Government’s. Id. We note that this effect is offset by
the broad coverage mandate—all drugs with clinical efficacy are to be included, unless one is
materially superior—and by the use of a Beneficiary Advisory Panel. See id.
Under Affordable Care Act regulations, P&T committees that serve plans offered on
Affordable Care Act marketplaces must consider the impact of any formulary placement decisions
on beneficiary access. Specifically, the P&T committee must ensure the formulary drug list:
“[p]rovides appropriate access to drugs that are included in broadly accepted treatment guidelines
and that are indicative of general best practices at the time.” 45 C.F.R. § 156.122(a)(3)(iii)(H)(2)
(2020). While this regulatory requirement would appear to protect beneficiary interest, it is
weakened by lack of clarity regarding what considerations are encompassed by the concept of
“appropriate access to drugs.” Furthermore, formulary decision-making under the Affordable Care
Act is open to challenge by beneficiaries only on grounds of comparative therapeutic effectiveness.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for
2016, 80 Fed. Reg, 10750, 10818 (Feb. 27, 2015); 45 C.F.R. § 156.122(c).
88. Perhaps the clearest and most robust requirements for P&T committees to protect the
interest of beneficiaries are those contained within regulations that apply to Medicare Part D
plans. These requirements include that P&T committee clinical decisions be based “on the strength
of scientific evidence and standards of practice, including assessing peer-reviewed medical
literature, pharmacoeconomic studies, outcomes research data, and other such information as it
determines appropriate,” and on a consideration of “whether the inclusion of a particular Part D
drug in a formulary or formulary tier has any therapeutic advantages in terms of safety and
efficacy.” 42 C.F.R. § 423.120(b)(1)(v)–(vi) (2020). P&T committees must endeavor to ensure “that
beneficiaries receive clinically appropriate medications at the lowest possible cost,” and that
utilization controls do not harm beneficiaries. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE
MODERNIZATION ACT FINAL GUIDELINES—FORMULARIES 1, https://www.cms.gov/medicare/prescriptiondrug-coverage/prescriptiondrugcovcontra/downloads/formularyguidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/832C-EBPT]. With respect to the burdens imposed on beneficiaries through utilization controls,
CMS requires Part D plan sponsors to “perform adequate oversight of their PBMs and other
delegated entities to verify that “utilization management requirements applied at point of sale
(POS), such as prior authorization (PA), step therapy (ST), and quantity limits (QL) not based upon
the FDA’s maximum daily dose limits” not cause “beneficiary harm due to impermissible delayed
or denied access to Part D drugs.” CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL, CHAPTER 6—PART D DRUGS AND FORMULARY REQUIREMENTS 23
(2016), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra
/Downloads/Part-D-Benefits-Manual-Chapter-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/E75U-KYLL].
89. The PBM market is dominated by just a few big players, with the distribution in 2019
being: (1) Caremark (CVS Health)/Aetna: thirty percent; (2) Express Scripts: twenty-three percent;
(3) OptumRx (UnitedHealth): twenty-three percent; (4) Humana Pharmacy Solutions: seven
percent; (5) MedImpact Healthcare Systems: six percent; (6) Prime Therapeutics: six percent; and
(7) All other PBMs and cash pay: four percent. Alia Paavola, Top PBMs by Market Share, BECKER’S
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that it uses “a four-step process involving the work of three distinct
committees.” 90
The first step is taken by the Therapeutic Assessment Committee,
which is made up of PBM-employed clinical pharmacists and
physicians, whose task is to evaluate new drugs and make a formulary
placement recommendation to the P&T committee. 91 It is unclear
whether this committee considers the profitability of the drug for the
PBM in making its recommendations, but it seems likely that it does,
given the specific disclaimer of such considerations with respect to the
National Pharmacy & Therapeutics Committee.
The second step is taken by the National Pharmacy & Therapeutics
Committee (referred to by Express Scripts as the P&T Committee),
which is made up of independent physicians and pharmacists.92
According to Express Scripts, at this stage:
The P&T Committee is tasked to review medications from a
purely clinical perspective. The Committee does not have access
to, nor does it consider, any information regarding Express
Scripts’ rebates/negotiated discounts, or the net cost of the
drug after application of all discounts. The Committee does not
use price, in any way, to make formulary placement
decisions. . . . The P&T Committee can establish one of the
following four placement designations: include, access, optional,
or exclude from a formulary. 93
The third step is taken by the Value Assessment Committee (VAC),
which is made up of PBM-employees who consider the
net cost, market share, and drug utilization trends of
clinically similar medications [to make formulary
recommendations]. . . . [E]conomic
considerations
are
superseded by the clinical requirements of the P&T Committee.
Once complete, formulary and tier placement recommendations
are then forwarded to the P&T Committee for final approval.94

HOSP. REV. (May 30, 2019), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/pharmacy/top-pbms-bymarket-share.html [https://perma.cc/NT7G-3EH5].
90. EXPRESS SCRIPTS, WHITE PAPER: FORMULARY DEVELOPMENT AT EXPRESS SCRIPTS (2019),
https://corporate-site-labs-prod.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/2019-11/Formulary%20Development
_November%202019%5B2%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/86FY-2BZJ].
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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The VAC committee clearly injects economic considerations of the plan
and PBM into the mix, with the caveat that they are to be “superseded
by clinical requirements.” 95
The fourth and final step is taken by the National Pharmacy &
Therapeutics Committee. At this juncture, this committee seems to
perform a broad oversight function rather than engage in any
significant independent analysis. The National Pharmacy &
Therapeutics Committee’s mandate with respect to this last step is to
annually “review the final formulary recommendations, by drug class,
for the upcoming plan year. The Committee uses this opportunity to
ensure adherence to previously established formulary placement
recommendations, and to validate continued alignment with best
medical practices.” 96
Notably, despite what would appear to be a robust, multi-layer
review structure, none of the considerations mentioned at any stage are
beneficiary costs or benefits, other than clinical safety and efficacy. To
the extent that beneficiary interests supersede the PBM’s own financial
considerations, it is only with respect to the P&T committee’s
assessment of the clinical safety and efficacy of a drug. It would appear,
therefore, that in practice the two-step consideration of clinical, then
economic, effects, means that so long as the drug is clinically
appropriate, the determining factor as to where it will be placed is
economic and largely informed by the benefit (measured in terms of
short-term profit) of the placement to the PBM, (and, perhaps to the
plan), with little, if any, regard to the cost to patients or to the public.
When the Express Scripts formulary development process is taken
as a whole, the minor effort to manage conflicts—segregation of cost
considerations from clinical considerations—perversely renders the
P&T committee unable to ensure that PBM cost data and
recommendations are not infected by a conflict of interest or to ensure
that beneficiary interests are appropriately taken into account. The
result is a formulary design system in which the only limit on the PBM’s
ability to trade beneficiary interests for profit is a requirement that the
PBM not go so far as to wholly ignore the clinical assessments of the
P&T committee. This limitation does little to protect against the strong
incentives for PBMs to act in contravention of beneficiary interests in
order to obtain payments for placement from pharmaceutical
manufacturers. 97

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Rumore and Vogenberg note that “[b]etween 2004 and 2008, PBMs were the subject of six
major federal or multidistrict cases involving P&T fraudulent practices, resulting in more than
$371.9 million in damages to states, plans, and patients.” Martha M. Rumore & F. Randy
Vogenberg, PBM P&T Practices: The HEAT Initiative Is Gaining Momentum, 42 P&T 330, 332 (2017),
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Adding to this problem is that incentives that may have biased PBM
decision-making are not transparent. As noted above, the P&T
committee itself may be entirely unaware of how profit-related
considerations have biased the data which it is provided. Beneficiaries
and plans are also in the dark, because rebate contracts are secret.98
Accordingly, nobody knows the full extent of the practice nor how much
it costs the health system in unrealized savings. In this regard,
Professor Robin Feldman, of the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law explained:
The deals between the drug companies and the PBM middle
players are guarded as fiercely as Fort Knox. . . . No one gets to
see them. But new research is turning up plenty of evidence of
rebates distorting the market, such as numerous instances of
effective, less expensive generics missing from formularies or

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5398626/ [https://perma.cc/7D7K-YWVN]; see, e.g.,
Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 298 (1st Cir. 2005). Rowe explained that PBMs
acting as intermediaries
have the opportunity to engage in activities that may benefit the drug manufacturers
and PBMs financially to the detriment of the health benefit providers. For example, in
cases of “therapeutic interchange,” a PBM may substitute a more expensive brand name
drug for an equally effective and cheaper generic drug. This is done so that the PBM can
collect a fee from the manufacturer for helping to increase the manufacturer’s market
share within a certain drug category. Similarly, a PBM might receive a discount from a
manufacturer on a particular drug but not pass any of it on to the health benefit
provider, keeping the difference for itself. The health benefit provider, however, often
has no idea that a PBM may not be working in its interest. This lack of awareness is the
result of the fact that there is little transparency in a PBM’s dealings with
manufacturers and pharmacies. As the district court noted, “[w]hether and how a PBM
actually saves an individual benefits provider customer money with respect to the
purchase of a particular prescription drug is largely a mystery to the benefits provider.”
Rowe, 429 F.3d at 298 ; see also Jason Laday, PBMs Blamed for Step Therapy, Nonmedical Switching, Other
Restrictions on Patients, HEALIO (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.healio.com/news/rheumatology/20190821
/pbms-blamed-for-step-therapy-nonmedical-switching-other-restrictions-on-patients [https://
perma.cc/6KYH-YFNL] (“‘The PBMs are in the center: they are the controllers, and they interact
with the manufacturers and decide placement on formulary, deciding which drugs we can
prescribe first, leading to step therapy and nonmedical switching, and all the other horrible
utilization management things for our patients,’ Levin, who practices at Bay Area Rheumatology,
in Clearwater, Florida, told attendees at the 2019 Rheumatology Nurses Society Annual
Conference. ‘The PBMs are the cause of it. They create formularies, and the manufacturers have to
pay to get that formulary placement.’ ‘Formulary placement is not rational,’ he added. ‘It is not
rational based on what works for our patients, or what is efficacious or safe, or well-tolerated.
None of that really counts. The only thing that counts is how much money — how big of a truck
they can pull up, filled with cash — they can give to the PBMs. That is really what all of this is
about.’”).
98. See Hancock & Lupkin, supra note 58; see also Qui Tam Complaint, supra note 68, at 6
(recounting the statement by a Caremark official that Caremark was not required to disclose the
actual prices that it was paying pharmacies to its plan-client, Aetna).
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patients burdened with higher out-of-pocket costs for generic
drugs. 99
P&T committees are perhaps the only structural aspect of the
formulary design process that, at least theoretically, may protect
beneficiary interests. However, because P&T committees are so closely
affiliated with and largely dependent on PBMs, they are unable to
robustly protect beneficiary interests. Under a system that allows
manufacturers to pay PBMs for formulary placement, PBMs have every
incentive to, and do, limit P&T committees to a therapeutic advisory
role. This dynamic renders P&T committees ineffective at, if not
entirely unconcerned with, preventing the imposition of barriers to
access to care. Simply put, there is no one assuring that beneficiaries
are fairly rewarded for the restrictions imposed upon them, as costsavings that result from the formulary structure are often diverted to
PBMs and plans, rather than reflected in lower costs to beneficiaries.
III. ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTES COULD MITIGATE MANUFACTURER
INFLUENCE ON PBMS
While the risk of harm posed to beneficiaries by payment to PBMs
for placement seems clear, whether and how to address this risk has
been a source of great consternation for legislators and regulators. 100 In
this Part, we demonstrate that the federal, 101 and by analogy, the state
anti kickback laws, 102 can be used to stop manufacturers from paying
PBMs to influence purchasing decisions through formulary
placement. 103 The anti-kickback laws create a comprehensive
framework of powerful beneficiary protections that has proven effective
with respect to other arrangements for the delivery of healthcare items
and services. Making it clear that PBMs must follow the path
established by this framework should go a long way toward protecting
beneficiary interests. Despite much handwringing by lawmakers and
regulators as to whether and how to refine these laws so as to better
address PBM incentives, these laws can be employed, in their current

99. See Hancock & Lupkin, supra note 58.
100. See generally Charles Roehrig, Rebates, Coupons, PBMs, and the Cost of the Prescription Drug
Benefit, HEALTH AFFS. (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180424.
17957/full/ [https://perma.cc/H5DQ-SJJ8] (explaining how payments for placement can result in
overall higher health care costs).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
102. See supra note 26 and sources cited.
103. The federal AKS pertains to federal health care programs (e.g., Medicare Part D,
Medicaid MCOs, and TRICARE), while the state analogs may pertain to state governmental
programs, all payors, commercial or governmental, or only commercial plans.
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form, to address misalignment in economic incentives that causes PBMs
to enter into arrangements that harm beneficiaries. In other words, the
problem is not that the law permits the abuse of beneficiaries, but that
understanding and enforcement of the law has been sub-par, rendering
it essentially meaningless in this context.
In this Part, we argue for a clearly expressed, coherent, and
predictable approach to anti-kickback enforcement. This enforcement
must focus on manufacturer payments to PBMs for placement, which
we argue are legally impermissible, as distinct from payments to plans
for access or inclusion, which we argue are legally permissible. Whether
payments for placement are styled as rebates or otherwise, they are
designed to induce the PBM-recipient to improperly drive purchase
volume toward the manufacturer’s product. Clearly, these payments are
not permissible price concessions offered to plans (or to PBMs as agents
for the plans), but are, rather, payments offered to PBMs for their own
account. 104 This is problematic because there is at least the prospect that
payments made to plans may be passed through to beneficiaries in the
form of lower drug prices or lower premiums, whereas payments to
PBMs will not benefit plans, let alone beneficiaries. Also, these
payments for placement differ from permissible price concessions, and
would be problematic regardless of the intended recipient. Permissible
price concessions come without any strings attached (i.e., with only the
hope or expectation that favorable treatment may result), while
payments for placement are contingent on placement; that is, they are
made in exchange for taking specific action to prefer a drug over its
competitors. 105 Price concessions offered without conditions serve the
interests of price competition without requiring the imposition of
burdens on beneficiaries. On the other hand, price concessions with
conditions require that burdens be imposed on beneficiaries, and
essentially supplant the P&T committee’s role in the formulary design
process. The distinction between payments for placement and
payments for inclusion is well-supported by existing law, with the
former being permitted if structured properly (and made to a plan), and
the latter being prohibited. However, this distinction is often ignored in

104. To the extent that rebates are retained only as an offset to administrative fees, we think
they should be seen as essentially paid to the plans. In that instance, the arrangement should
qualify for GPO safe harbor protection. See supra Section III.B.
105. This distinction has been a long-standing feature of AKS jurisprudence. See, e.g., United
States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[A] hospital or individual may lawfully
enter into a business relationship with a doctor and even hope for or expect referrals from that
doctor, so long as the hospital is motivated to enter into the relationship for legal reasons entirely
distinct from its collateral hope for referrals.”); United States v. Rogan, No. 02 C 3310, 2006 WL
8427270, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2006), aff’d, 517 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A] hope, expectation or
belief that referrals may ensue from remuneration for legitimate services is not a violation of the
AKS.”).
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analyzing when a payment from a manufacturer to, or through, a PBM
is proper.
A. Other Bodies of Law Fail to Sufficiently Protect Beneficiaries
To the extent that targeted attempts have been made to address
misaligned incentives between PBMs and beneficiaries, they have, at
best, been piecemeal and insufficient to meaningfully protect
beneficiary interests—and, at worst, entirely failed. For example,
plaintiffs in lawsuits against PBMs have asserted that PBMs and plans
have violated their ERISA 106-based fiduciary duties by entering into
payment-for-placement
arrangements
with
pharmaceutical
manufacturers that disadvantage the plan beneficiaries. 107 On the
whole, these plaintiffs have not succeeded in their arguments because
courts have held that the PBM is not a fiduciary to the plan
beneficiaries. 108 States have also passed legislation imposing various
duties on PBMs, 109 seeking to protect beneficiaries from being charged
106. ERISA is the primary law that governs employee benefit plans. See Fact Sheet: What Is
ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resourcecenter/fact-sheets/what-is-erisa [https://perma.cc/WRY9-FGJ8].
107. See, e.g., In re Express Scripts, Inc., PBM Litig., No. 05-MD-01672, 2008 WL 2952787 (E.D.
Mo. July 30, 2008); In re Medco Health Solutions, Inc., Pharmacy Benefits Mgmt. Litig., No. 03MDL-01508 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009).
Additionally, some cases focus on the behavior that the PBM is incentivized to engage in,
rather than on the payments that are made to the PBM patients and physicians to encourage use of
drugs that result in higher rebates to PBMs. See, e.g., States Attorneys General v. Caremark, Inc., et
al. (filed Feb. 14, 2008).
108. See, e.g., Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 301 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that
the duty to disclose conflicts of interests and payments from drug manufacturers is “purely
ministerial” and “simply not sufficient” to find that the PBMs act as fiduciaries under ERISA); In re
Express Scripts, Inc., PBM Litig., No. 05-MD-01672, 2008 WL 2952787, at *10 (E.D. Mo. July 30,
2008) (“Plaintiffs state that ESI exercised discretion in negotiating with the pharmaceutical
manufacturers over rebates, and in controlling plan assets, i.e. the rebates due to the plans.
Plaintiffs’ position is an ineffective attempt at placing the cart before the horse. Rebates are not per
se plan assets. . . . Once these amounts became payable, they became ‘plan assets.’ Prior to this
point, i.e. when ESI was negotiating with pharmaceutical manufacturers for its entire book of
business, without regard to any particular plan; the rebates were not plan assets. . . . The fact that
ESI conducted negotiations in the absence of plans, does not trigger some duty to represent the best
interests of the plans. . . . Next, once the rebates became payable, ESI was contractually required
to pay the plan a fixed portion of the same. Thus, ESI did not exercise discretion in the disposition
of plan assets. . . . Accordingly, ESI is not a fiduciary for the purpose of negotiating rebates with
pharmaceutical manufacturers.” (citations omitted)); see also Negron v. Cigna Health & Life Ins.,
300 F. Supp. 3d 341 (D. Conn. 2018); In re UnitedHealth Grp. PBM Litig., No. 16-cv-3352, 2017 WL
6512222 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2017) (involving allegation of claw backs, not specifically linked to
formulary design).
109. See, e.g., Rowe, 429 F.3d at 298–99 (“With the aim of placing Maine health benefit
providers in a better position to determine whether PBMs are acting against their interests, and
correspondingly, to help control prescription drug costs and increase access to prescription drugs,
the Maine Legislature enacted the UPDPA in the spring of 2003. The UPDPA imposes a number of
requirements on those PBMs that choose to enter into contracts in Maine with ‘covered entities’—
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more in cost-sharing than would be the case if they were to buy a
comparable drug (e.g., a generic) outside of the plan, as well as “anticlaw-back” 110 and “anti-gag rule” 111 legislation. However, the effects of
these state laws are sometimes undermined by ERISA preemption. 112 In
any event, these types of state laws are directed at fixing very limited
problems deriving from the current state of PBM-manufacturer
relationships, but they do not address the fundamental problem of
distorted, hidden incentives, and they have not stopped PBMs from
entering into problematic payment-for-placement arrangements with
manufacturers.
Some state 113 and federal 114 laws attempt to mitigate the risks posed
by PBM conflicts of interest by mandating transparency. These laws
require disclosure of financial information that could shed some light
on the extent to which PBMs may be profiting from arrangements that
are costly to beneficiaries. 115 These laws depend on “sunshine” having its
intended effect, which, in such a complex area, seems unlikely.
meaning health benefit providers and including, in part, insurance companies, the state Medicaid
program, and employer health plans. Such PBMs are required to act as fiduciaries for their clients
and adhere to certain specific duties. For example, they must disclose conflicts of interest,
disgorge profits from self-dealing, and disclose to the covered entities certain of their financial
arrangements with third parties. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2699(2) (A–G) (West 2005). The
disclosures made by the PBMs to the covered entities are protected by confidentiality. None of the
disclosures are available to the public.”). UPDPA has since been repealed. Unfair Prescription Drug
Practices Act, 22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2699 (West 2003) (repealed 2011).
110. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27F-6 (West 2021) (prohibiting PBMs from requiring
covered persons to make a payment at the point of sale that exceeds the amount the person would
pay if purchasing the drug without using a health plan).
111. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19b (“A group health plan or a health insurance issuer offering
group or individual health insurance coverage shall—(1) not restrict, directly or indirectly, any
pharmacy that dispenses a prescription drug to an enrollee in the plan or coverage from informing
(or penalize such pharmacy for informing) an enrollee of any differential between the enrollee’s
out-of-pocket cost under the plan or coverage with respect to acquisition of the drug and the
amount an individual would pay for acquisition of the drug without using any health plan or health
insurance coverage; and (2) ensure that any entity that provides pharmacy benefits management
services under a contract with any such health plan or health insurance coverage does not, with
respect to such plan or coverage, restrict, directly or indirectly, a pharmacy that dispenses a
prescription drug from informing (or penalize such pharmacy for informing) an enrollee of any
differential between the enrollee’s out-of-pocket cost under the plan or coverage with respect to
acquisition of the drug and the amount an individual would pay for acquisition of the drug without
using any health plan or health insurance coverage.”).
112. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, 141 S. Ct. 474 (2020) (illustrating an
unsuccessful ERISA preemption challenge to a state law regulating PBMs).
113. See, e.g., Unfair Prescription Drug Practices Act, 22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2699
(repealed 2011). The law imposed the duty to disclose, among other things, any “conflict of interest”
and “all financial terms and arrangements for remuneration of any kind that apply between the
[PBM] and any prescription drug manufacturer or labeler.” Id.
114. There are two recent attempts by the Federal government at mandating transparency. See
86 Fed. Reg. 66662 (Nov. 23, 2021); 84 Fed. Reg. 65464 (Nov. 27, 2019).
115. For example, “[s]tatutes enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act require PBMs to
disclose competitively sensitive information to certain health plan sponsor clients and to the
federal government. Specifically, the Act requires PBMs that manage drug coverage under a
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Most recently, an attempt to essentially outlaw rebates to PBMs or
plans for drugs reimbursed by Medicare Part D plans (via amendment
of the AKS’s regulatory discount safe harbor) seems doomed to flounder
for both political and procedural reasons. 116 As discussed further below,
even if this regulation is adopted, it applies only to Part D plans and
leaves some important questions unanswered.
Though well intended, these piecemeal efforts at regulating PBMs
have proven ineffective. They are largely side-stepped or ignored by
PBMs and have been enforced only sporadically. Significantly, rather
than provide clarity, the regulatory focus on transparency, when
combined with limited enforcement (and the fact that much
enforcement ends in settlements rather than opinions providing
authoritative guidance) opens the door to confusion and defensiveness,
especially in the face of widespread acknowledgment of manufacturer
payments to PBMs. For example, a PBM may think or argue that
manufacturer rebates to PBMs are permissible so long as they are
disclosed (under the rationale that the disclosure requirement connotes
the permissibility of the underlying arrangements). Likewise, a PBM
may think or argue that there is ambiguity as to what is prohibited by
the AKS, or as to the wrongfulness of the conduct (i.e., that the practice
is so widespread and well known that if it were impermissible, there
would be more enforcement). 117 Even though there are clearly
counterarguments to these assertions, 118 the government should more
clearly signal that it supports, and then in fact engage in, enforcement
of, a bright-line prohibition on the problematic behavior—that is,
payments for placement by manufacturers to PBMs. This will provide
clear guidance to PBMs and manufacturers, change the way business is
done, and protect beneficiary interests.

contract with a Medicare Part D drug plan or qualified health benefits plans offered through a state
exchange to disclose certain financial and prescription drug dispensing information relating to
their client contracts. The required information includes: (1) ‘the aggregate amount, and the type of
rebates, discounts, or price concessions . . . that the PBM negotiates that are attributable to patient
utilization under the plan,’ (2) ‘the aggregate amount of the rebates, discounts, or price
concessions that are passed through to the plan sponsor,’ (3) ‘the total number of prescriptions that
were dispensed,’ and (4) ‘[t]he aggregate amount of the difference between the amount the health
benefits plan pays the PBM and the amount that the PBM pays retail pharmacies, and mail order
pharmacies. . . .’ From this information, PBM clients can calculate amounts relevant to the
contractual arrangement between the PBM and sponsor clients.” Joanna Shepherd, Is More
Information Always Better? Mandatory Disclosure Regulations in the Prescription Drug Market, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 14 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2014/02/0000688685.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9WH-QPPM] (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-23) (citations omitted).
116. See infra Section III.C.
117. The retort to this is that an absence of widespread enforcement does not necessarily
signal an endorsement.
118. See supra notes 105–06.
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B. The AKS’s Potential Remains Untapped
To our knowledge, despite the widespread practice of making
payments to PBMs for inclusion and/or placement, and the various
governmental statements indicating that the practice implicates the
AKS, there has been little AKS enforcement activity in this area. For
example, we are not aware of any cases squarely holding that
manufacturer rebates to PBMs conditioned on formulary inclusion or
placement violate the AKS. The government has acknowledged that the
“current system” is problematic, essentially for all the reasons that we
have discussed, but seems to assume that some radical regulatory
change is required in order to address these problems.119
We speculate that a number of factors contribute to this lack of AKS
enforcement against manufacturer payments to PBMs for inclusion or
placement. First, the fact that the practice is so widespread creates both
practical and political problems. The PBM industry is powerful and
large, and its profitability is dependent on the receipt of manufacturer
rebates. 120 There is a strong lobby advocating that PBMs serve
important policy goals. 121 Second, volume rebates to plans are clearly
permissible and desirable, and it is difficult to identify when a payment
is being made for the account of the PBM and when it is being made to
the PBM as an agent for the plan. Indeed, the two settlements we have
located that deal with the legality of manufacturer payments for
placement under the AKS both seem to assume that rebates to PBMs are
legally permissible, presumably under the discount safe harbor, so long
as the payment is made in the form of a rebate on the drug being
accorded the preference, rather than in some other fashion. 122 Third, it
119. See, e.g., Safe Harbors Proposed Rule, supra note 21.
120. See supra Section I.C.
121. See, e.g., Lev Facher, PBMs, Under Fire from the Trump Administration, Spend a Record Sum on
Lobbying, STAT (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/04/23/pbms-phrma-lobbying-q12019/ [https://perma.cc/HA7D-VUTQ].
122. The first settlement involved rebates paid by the pharmaceutical manufacturer, Roche, to
the insurance company, Humana. See Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, Humana and Roche Settle False
Claims Act Lawsuit for $12.5 Million, GLOBENEWSWIRE (Feb. 8, 2021), https://
www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2021/02/08/2171502/0/en/Humana-and-Roche-SettleFalse-Claims-Act-Lawsuit-for-12-5-Million.html [https://perma.cc/JF7Z-WWMU]; Second Amended
Complaint, United States ex rel. Derrick v. Roche Diagnostics Corp., 14-cv-04601 (N.D. Ill. 2017), ECF
No. 29, [https://perma.cc/4PF7-XB6F]. The case, in which the U.S. Department of Justice chose not
to intervene, settled for $12.5 million. Id. That case was predicated on an allegation that Roche paid
Humana a kickback for formulary placement in the form of lump sum debt forgiveness
conditioned on the exclusion of competitors. Id. The debt resulted from an overpayment of rebates
by Roche to Humana, which in turn resulted from Humana’s failure to follow through on its
promise to Roche—a condition to earning the rebates—to accord Roche’s products favorable
copayment status. Id. While the relator in that case alleged that trading debt forgiveness for
placement implicated the statute, she apparently did not question the legitimacy of the underlying
rebate arrangement. Id. She alleged simply that “Roche’s reduction of Humana’s obligation to
repay Roche in exchange for new and continued access to Humana’s formularies violates the AKS’s
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is not easy to articulate a clear analytical distinction between rebates
that are protected by the discount safe harbor and those that are not.
Making this distinction requires that one identify not only when rebates
are extended to PBMs and when they are extended to plans (as the
discount safe harbor categorically excludes the former but not the
latter), but also when they are extended to plans, when they are made in
exchange for actions that implicate the AKS, and when they are
extended solely in the service of price competition. Depending on the
facts, these distinctions can be fairly subtle and may not be widely
appreciated.
These complexities are underscored by the New Rule, 123 under
which the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has indicated that
payments to plans predicated on the performance of some
contingencies (denominated as “services”) are impermissible, but that
other contingencies are not considered services and may be
permitted. 124 In this regard, the government explains that developing
prohibition against providing and accepting remuneration for referral of medical items paid for by
federal health care programs.” Id. at 15–16. In other words, she seems to be assuming that a rebate
given in exchange for imposing burdensome copayment restrictions on competitive products does
not implicate the statute, but that debt relief given for formulary inclusion would implicate the
statute—perhaps reasoning, we think incorrectly, that the initial payment was protected by the
discount safe harbor, whereas the latter was not. The second case resulted in a $7.9 million
settlement between the Government and AstraZeneca. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
AstraZeneca to Pay $7.9 Million to Resolve Kickback Allegations (Feb. 11, 2015), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/astrazeneca-pay-79-million-resolve-kickback-allegations [https://perma.cc
/VZ9S-7333]. In that case, the relator seems to have similarly assumed that payments for placement
are permissible, so long as they are made for the same drugs as are accorded the placement
preference. Id. The settlement resolved
allegations that AstraZeneca agreed to provide remuneration to Medco Health
Solutions, a pharmacy benefit manager, in exchange for Medco maintaining Nexium’s
“sole and exclusive” status on certain Medco formularies and through other marketing
activities related to those Medco formularies. The United States alleged that
AstraZeneca provided some or all of the remuneration to Medco through price
concessions on drugs other than Nexium, namely on Prilosec, Toprol XL and Plendil.
The United States contended that this kickback arrangement between AstraZeneca and
Medco violated the Federal Anti-Kickback [S]tatute, and thereby caused the submission
of false or fraudulent claims for Nexium to the Retiree Drug Subsidy Program.
Id. While this enforcement action could be seen as supporting the proposition that payment to
PBMs for placement is illegal, it is probably better understood to suggest that the problem is not
with the payment of rebates but with according rebates for preferences on another.
123. It is unclear whether this rule will ultimately be implemented. While its original effective
date was not until 2022, as of this writing, its adoption has been delayed until at least 2023 by a
court order issued in a case brought by the pharmaceutical industry based largely on principles of
administrative law. Order, Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., No.
21-cv-00095 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2021), ECF No. 19, https://s3-prod.modernhealthcare.com/2021-02
/Drug%20Rebate%20Decision%20Date%20Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6G3-W42B].
124. The new rule articulates a fairly comprehensive approach to the issue of rebates. First, it
reprises the principle that manufacturer rebates to PBMs are not protected. See PBM Final Rule,
supra note 6, at 76731. It goes further, however, and also prohibits rebates to plans. Id. In fact,
under this rule, rebates are protected only if they are passed through to beneficiaries at the point-
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and managing a formulary is a service that a PBM provides to a plan,
and thus, presumably is not something for which a manufacturer could
ever pay a plan. 125 Additionally, developing and managing preferred
drug lists and prior authorization programs, performing drug
utilization review, and operating disease management programs all
qualify as “services” for which payment is not protected, and, thus,
essentially prohibited under the Final Rule. 126 However, “[w]hether
other arrangements would be considered a ‘service’ that would not be
protected, such as . . . conditioning a reduction in price on a formulary
not covering a competing drug . . . , would be subject to a case-by-case
analysis.” 127 Conditioning payment on exclusion of a competitive drug
would seem to implicate the statute in the same manner as the services
for which that government has indicated it is impermissible to pay (i.e.,
developing and managing a preferred drug list and paying for
competitive placement seem to be the same thing). It is unclear why
OIG sees this as an open question, or why it has not seen fit to articulate
the rationale on which it might predicate such a distinction. Also
unarticulated are the factors that will be used to determine what
constitutes a service in any particular case. Accordingly, even in the
context of what appears to be an attempt at comprehensive reform, the
government has not grappled with exactly what contingences are
improper, and has left the door open to imposing significant
contingences as a quid pro quo for a rebate (albeit one that is passed to
beneficiaries). 128
of-service, and then, only if the rebates are not made contingent on the performance of certain
acts, called “services.” Id. The rule specifically excludes from the definition of protected
“discounts,” any rebate or other reductions in price “in connection with the sale or purchase of a
prescription pharmaceutical product from a manufacturer to a plan sponsor under Medicare Part
D either directly to the plan sponsor under Medicare Part D, or indirectly through a pharmacy
benefit manager acting under contract with a plan sponsor under Medicare Part D, unless it is a
price reduction or rebate that is required by law.” See id. Notably, the new rule does not exclude
from the ambit of safe harbor protection payments made to PBMs, as those would not (as we have
argued) be covered by the safe harbor in the first instance.
125. Id. at 76683. This point is made in the context of talking about what services are eligible
for protection under the provisions of the safe harbor that protect fixed fees to PBMs from
manufacturers, stressing that a manufacturer cannot pay a PBM for a service that a PBM provides
to a plan.
126. Id. at 76688.
127. Id. at 76683.
128. Even if adopted, the Final Rule’s impact will not negate the need for the analysis we
outline. In addition to leaving open the key question of what is a “service,” the impact of the Final
Rule is limited to formularies utilized in connection with certain federal health care programs. See
id. (“HHS/OIG did not implement its proposal to extend this provision to rebates related to
Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCO). The stated basis for this decision is that rebates in
the Medicaid MCO context have minimal impact on beneficiaries because of the way in which
Medicaid cost-sharing obligations are structured. The Preamble also makes clear that sales
covered by Medicare Part B are not covered by the new definition.”). The Rule will not have a direct
impact on other health care programs. If the Rule is ultimately implemented, it may have a broader
impact to the extent that these other programs are governed by state mini-AKSs, and those
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While current law can be fairly read to prohibit PBMs and plans
from accepting payments for formulary placement, applying that law is
a painstaking process that requires an understanding of many factual
and legal subtleties. Given this, the PBM industry might do well to
consider following the example of other industry actors faced with
similar problems by adopting a code of ethics that clarifies what is and
is not permissible in terms of day-to-day patterns of operation. 129
C. A Brief Overview of the Anti-Kickback Statute
The AKS, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b, is a federal anti-corruption law
which seeks to prohibit financial incentives from distorting selection
decisions of persons in a position to mediate access to healthcare items
and services that are paid for by Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal
government healthcare programs. 130 To ensure that the selection of
covered products is made on the basis of appropriate considerations,
such as price, quality, and service, rather than on the basis of personal
benefits to gate-keepers, the AKS prohibits a pharmaceutical
manufacturer from paying anything of value to a person who can

statutes incorporate by reference the federal safe-harbors, or are amended to incorporate the
substance of the Final Rule. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-161c (West 2021); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 400.474 (West 2021); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.039 (West 2021). All three state statutes
expressly incorporate the federal safe harbors.
The OIG’s reluctance to establish a bright line on this topic is clear in the following exchange
in the preamble to the New Rule:
The commenter also asked OIG to state that it will subject PBMs to heightened scrutiny
for any arrangements conditioned on formulary placement that do not fit within the
new safe harbors.
Response: . . . OIG agrees with the commenter that the proper question is whether
entities are in compliance with the anti-kickback statute; we reiterate, however, that
compliance with a safe harbor is voluntary. Any arrangement that implicates the antikickback statute and does not satisfy an exception or safe harbor would be subject to
scrutiny; as discussed in more detail below, we reiterate our concern about any kind of
payment to buy or provide remuneration tied to formulary placement that is not a safe
harbored reduction in price.
PBM Final Rule, supra note 6, at 76679.
129. See, e.g., ADVAMED, ADVAMED CODE OF ETHICS (2021), https://www.advamed.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/AdvaMed-Code-of-Ethics-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JCV-XAGY]; Code
on Interactions with Health Care Professionals, PHRMA (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.phrma.org
/resource-center/Topics/STEM/Code-on-Interactions-with-Health-Care-Professionals [https://
perma.cc/3Q4M-3WRV].
130. For a summary history of the AKS, see Thomas S. Crane, Samantha Kingsbury, Karen
Lovitch & Carrie Roll, What Is the Anti-Kickback Statute, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/health-law/what-is-antikickback-statute/ [https://perma.cc/G467-Q7BG].
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influence product selection (such as a PBM) to induce that person to
purchase a covered product. 131 Specifically, the statute provides that:
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly
or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind . . .
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for
or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good,
facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program, shall be
guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years,
or both. 132
Subsection (2) of the statute contains identical provisions applicable to
the offeror of the remuneration. 133
A violation of the AKS occurs only when remuneration is given with
the improper purpose of inducing the recipient to deliver business.134
131. See, e.g., Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68
Fed. Reg. 23731 (May 5, 2003), https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/compliance-guidance/799
/050503FRCPGPharmac.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6BQ-W5PG] [hereinafter Compliance Program
Guidance].
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b). While there are no definitive definitions of the terms “refer” or
“arrange,” the preamble to the regulations indicates that conduct designed to encourage use would
contemplate a recommendation or arranging for the use of a product:
The statute . . . prohibits the offering or acceptance of remuneration . . . for the
purposes of “arranging for or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering
any . . . service or item” payable under Medicare or Medicaid. Thus, we believe that
many marketing and advertising activities may involve at least technical violations of
the statute. We, of course, recognize that many of these advertising and marketing
activities do not warrant prosecution in part because (1) they are passive in nature, i.e.,
the activities do not involve direct contact with program beneficiaries, or (2) the
individual or entity involved in these promotions is not involved in the delivery of health
care. Such individuals or entities are not in a position of public trust in the same
manner as physicians or other health care professionals who recommend or order
products and services for their patients. Thus, we agree that many advertising and
marketing activities warrant safe harbor protection under the personal services and
management contracts safe harbor.
However, we have experienced many instances where promoters and consultants have
become involved in marketing activities that encourage health care providers and
others to violate the statute, such as to develop impermissible joint venture
arrangements or to routinely waive coinsurance and deductible amounts owed under
Medicare Part B. It would be inappropriate to allow such activities to receive safe
harbor protection.
Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56
Fed. Reg. 35952 (July 29, 1991).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).
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The AKS does not contain a definition of “inducement” and the term has
not been conclusively defined. However, courts have indicated that in
order to be considered inducement, the intention must be to actually
exert influence through the provision of the remuneration, rather than
simply understanding that the situation might normally lead to
business. For example, the 2000 Tenth Circuit case United States v.
McClatchey 135 holds that the mere hope or expectation that referrals may
result from remuneration designed for entirely different purposes is
not a violation of the AKS, and that there must be an actual offer or
payment of remuneration with the goal of inducing referrals. 136
The AKS has been interpreted to cover any arrangement where one
purpose of remuneration is to induce or reward such actions, even if the
arrangement serves other, legitimate purposes.137 Thus, even if there is
a proper justification for the payment at issue, that proper purpose is
irrelevant if there is evidence of an additional, improper purpose.
A discount clearly is something of value, normally offered with the
intent of inducing purchases, and, without more, would consequently
implicate the AKS. But the AKS allows certain discounts as long as they
are properly disclosed and appropriately reflected in the provider’s
claim. 138 The statute does not specify when a reduction in price is
“properly disclosed and appropriately reflected.” The OIG’s regulatory
guidance clarifies that what must be reported is the reduced price, net
of discount, not a comparison to a list or contract price. 139 In other
words, a discount is properly reported if the applicable report shows the
price actually paid by the buyer.
Many states have enacted “mini-AKSs” that mirror the language
and purpose of the AKS, but often they are not limited to governmentreimbursed healthcare items or services; they also apply to items or
services paid for by commercial insurers. 140 Taken together, state miniAKSs and the federal AKS create a comprehensive (and overlapping)
legal framework that is explicitly designed to prevent financial
incentives from improperly influencing the decision-making of those
who are in a position to drive healthcare purchases.141

134. United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d
Cir. 1985).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A).
139. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the Initial
OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under the
Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63518, 63527 (Nov. 19, 1999).
140. See supra note 26.
141. For a discussion of whether the federal AKS preempts state AKSs that apply to federal
health care program business, see Franklin T. Pyle III, The Federal Anti-Kickback Statute Has No
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Regulations that implement the federal AKS contain a number of
safe harbors protecting common renumeration arrangements that
regulators have deemed non-problematic. 142 Arrangements that meet
the requirements of a safe harbor are protected from the inference that
any remuneration that flows between parties to the arrangement may
be grounds for liability under the AKS. For example, an arrangement
with a physician in which the physician is paid for bona fide consulting
services will be deemed non-problematic if it meets the requirements of
the safe harbor for personal services, including the requirement that all
payments be fair market value for the consulting services rendered,
without additional inquiry into the subjective purpose of the
arrangement. 143
Recognizing the necessity of price competition in a commercial
health care market, both the AKS and state mini-AKSs (either implicitly
or explicitly) permit purchase incentives that take the form of
discounts. 144 The federal AKS accomplishes this through a regulatory
discount safe harbor. 145 It provides that “the term discount means a
reduction in the amount a buyer (who buys either directly or through a
wholesaler or a group purchasing organization) is charged for an item
or service based on an arms-length transaction.” 146 Accordingly, to
qualify for safe harbor protection, the discounts must be offered to a
buyer, either directly, or through an intermediary, such as a PBM.147
This means that the discount safe harbor does not protect inducements
to middlemen who are not buyers. Thus, as further developed below, the
discount safe harbor does not protect payments to PBMs that are not passed
through to plans as price reductions.
Also, under the discount safe harbor, the discount must be limited
to incentivizing selection based on price. 148 The discount safe harbor
does not protect discounts that are given to induce plans or PBMs to
take some action that benefits the pharmaceutical manufacturer in a
Preemptive Power, Or Does It? Florida’s Supreme Court Holds Florida’s Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute
Unconstitutional, 112 PENN. STATE L. REV. 631 (2007).
142. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2020).
143. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d).
144. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-161c (West 2021); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.474 (West
2021); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.039 (West 2021).
145. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h). There is also a statutory exclusion for discounts. 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(b)(3)(A). However, the government has opined that any discount that falls outside of the
safe harbor is at least a technical violation of the statute, and subject to prosecution in the event
that it is deemed abusive. For example, the OIG has taken the position “that the regulatory safe
harbor includes all discounts Congress intended to protect under the statutory exception.”
Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the Initial OIG Safe
Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under the AntiKickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63518, 63527 (Nov. 19, 1999).
146. Id.
147. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h).
148. See id. § 1001.952(h)(5).
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manner otherwise precluded by the AKS beyond simply “purchasing”
the drug because it is cheaper. 149 In the context of formulary
development, a discount is protected by the safe harbor if offered to a
plan with the goal of influencing the plan, acting through its PBM, to
put the drug on formulary, because doing so will save the plan money.
Discounts are not protected by the safe harbor (and violate the AKS) if
made contingent on plans (or PBMs) engaging in specific behaviors that
encourage the use of the drug over another, such as placing the drug in
a preferred tier or giving a drug specific utilization-related preferences
(e.g., conditioning the discount on exempting the drug from prior
authorization requirements). Such a payment is not a discount, but
rather a payment for the service of arranging for the purchase of the
drug, and therefore does not fall under the discount safe harbor—
instead, it squarely implicates the statute. Accordingly, as further
developed below, the AKS and its state law analogs 150 should be read to
preclude any payments to PBMs for either formulary access or
formulary placement, as well as payments to plans for formulary
placement.
D. Payments by Manufacturers to PBMs Implicate the AKS and Are Not
Protected by the Discount Safe Harbor
Payments by manufacturers to health insurers who offer Part D,
Medicare Advantage (Part C), 151 or Medicaid managed care plans
implicate the AKS because the federal government pays for some or all
of the premiums for coverage extended under these plans, and thus can
be indirectly seen as a purchaser of the items and services covered by
the plan; that is, they are “federal health care programs” (FHPs) within
the meaning of the AKS. 152 Depending on the terms of the mini-AKS,

149. See id.
150. While only some of the state statutes precisely mirror the language of the AKS, they are
often interpreted to be consistent with the AKS. See, e.g., State Health Care Anti-Kickback Analogues,
LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, https://www.lowenstein.com/media/5538/state-health-care-anti-kickbackanalogues.pdf [https://perma.cc/38PS-WFED] (surveying differing language in each state).
151. We have not addressed Part C plans in this Article because of the very limited drug
coverage extended under them.
152. An FHP is any plan or program that provides health benefits, whether directly, through
insurance, or otherwise, which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States
government (other than the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program), or any state health care
program (including the Medicaid program, the Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant
program, or the Block Grants to States for Social Services program). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(f),
1320a-7(h); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2 (2020). By executive fiat, ACA plans are not subject to the AKS. HHS
stated that it “does not consider [qualified health plans] QHPs, other programs related to the
Federally-facilitated Marketplace, and other programs under Title I of the Affordable Care Act to
be federal healthcare programs.” Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health &

468

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:2

state and non-governmental funded plans may be regulated under
these statutes either because the states pay for the services, or because
the statutes are deigned to apply regardless of payor. When a plan that
is covered by the AKS or a mini-AKS makes a coverage or utilization
review related decision, it is influencing the choice of covered items or
services, and thus is arranging for provision of the item or service
within the meaning of these laws. 153 Most fundamentally, insurance
coverage influences which items or services are ordered (a physician
may, for example, choose to write a prescription for a covered drug,
rather than a non-covered drug) and whether referrals ultimately result
in a purchase (a patient may, for example, choose not to purchase a
prescribed drug if it is not covered). 154 When manufacturers make
payments for access and payments for placement, they are paying
PBMs to permit and encourage access to their product and, more
specifically, to drive purchase volume toward their product. 155 As with
remuneration flowing between manufacturers and insurance plans,
therefore, payments from manufacturers to PBMs likewise implicate
the AKS.
Where an arrangement implicates the AKS, the question becomes
whether the arrangement falls within a safe harbor. Whereas discounts
from list price, whether extended as up-front discounts or after-thefact rebates to plans and beneficiaries could be protected by the
discount safe harbor, rebate payments to PBMs cannot. The discount
safe harbor protects discounts and rebates from the AKS only if such
discounts and rebates are made to a buyer. 156 The government has long
observed that payments from manufacturers to PBMs are not protected
under the discount safe harbor because PBMs are not buyers. CMS has
explicitly stated: “Rebates paid by drug manufacturers to or through
PBMs to buy formulary position are not reductions in price. In the
Secretary’s view, such a payment would not qualify as ‘a discount or

Hum. Servs., to Jim McDermott, U.S. Rep. (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.hlregulation.com/files
/2013/10/The-Honorable-Jim-McDermott.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU9G-46U5].
153. See, e.g., Safe Harbors Proposed Rule, supra note 21, at 2340. The proposed rule explained
the need for a new amendment that would
explicitly exclude from the definition of a discount eligible for safe harbor protection
certain reductions in price or other remuneration from a manufacturer of prescription
pharmaceutical products to plan sponsors under Medicare Part D, Medicaid managed
care organizations as defined under section 1903(m) of the Act (Medicaid MCOs), or
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) under contract with them.
Id.
154. See, e.g., supra Section I.C.
155. See id.
156. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (h)(5) (“[F]or purposes of this paragraph, the term discount means a
reduction in the amount a buyer . . . is charged for an item or service based on an arms-length
transaction.”).
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other reduction in price.’” 157 OIG has also explained that payments by
drug manufacturers to PBMs “that are based on, or otherwise related
to, the PBM’s customers’ purchases potentially implicate the antikickback statute” 158 and that they can be protected by structuring them
“to fit in the [group purchasing organizations] safe harbor at 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.952 (j).” 159 That same guidance provides that “[l]ump sum
payments for inclusion in a formulary or for exclusive or restricted
formulary status are problematic and should be carefully
scrutinized.” 160 In late 2020, the government again affirmed this view,
stating that payments to PBMs, because they are not buyers, have never
been protected by the discount safe harbor. 161
E. Payments by Manufacturers to PBMs Are Generally Not Protected
by the GPO Safe Harbor
In the face of both the law and this guidance, the widespread
practice of PBMs retaining a portion of the rebates can be justified only
if the retention qualifies as a protected administrative fee under the
group purchasing organizations (GPOs) safe harbor, or can be
characterized as a payment by the manufacturer to the plan, and then
from the plan to the PBM for its services. 162 To our knowledge, most
rebating arrangements do not fit neatly into either such category.
The GPO safe harbor explicitly allows for the payment of fees by
manufacturers to GPOs, in return for their services in acting as broker
between manufacturers and purchasers. Since payments for placement
are made to PBMs for their services, they would seem much more
susceptible to characterization as GPO fees paid to PBMs than
discounts paid to plans, and, indeed, the government has specifically

157. See Safe Harbors Proposed Rule, supra note 21, at 2340.
158. See Compliance Program Guidance, supra note 131. The use of the term “potentially”
creates an opening to argue that such payments could be legally permissible in some, as yet
undefined, circumstances. However, our guess is the government intended only to signal that
protection under the GPO or managed care safe harbor (in circumstances where the PBM assumes
risk) might be available.
159. That safe harbor requires, among other things, that the payments be authorized in
advance by the PBM’s customer and that all amounts actually paid to the PBM on account of the
customer’s purchases be disclosed in writing at least annually to the customer. 42 C.F.R. §
1001.952(j). In addition, arrangements with PBMs that assume risk may raise different issues;
depending on the circumstances, protection for such arrangements may be available under the
managed care safe harbors at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (m), (t), and (u).
160. See Compliance Program Guidance, supra note 131.
161. PBM Final Rule, supra note 6.
162. Because it is unusual and involves fundamentally different considerations, we do not
discuss the circumstances under which it would be permissible for a risk-bearing PBM to retain a
rebate.
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recommended the use of the GPO safe harbor for such payments.163 In
our experience, however, rebate arrangements are not typically
structured for conformance with the GPO safe harbor, 164 likely because
it requires quite a bit of transparency, 165 and providing that level of
transparency would put the PBMs at a negotiating disadvantage.
It might be argued that the rebates are payments by manufacturers
to plans, and that the PBMs are merely serving as conduits for the
payments. However, rebates are almost never passed through in full, 166
thereby suggesting that the PBMs are not serving as conduits. It might
also be possible to argue that the portion of the rebate retained by the
PBM is simply an offset for the PBM’s fee. However, in a situation
where the plan knows neither the amount of the rebates or the “offset,”
such a characterization seems strained. If this is not enough, in a
situation where the rebate payment is negotiated and received by the
PBM, in exchange for PBM commitments, it seems clear that the
payment is to the PBM and not the plan. In short, under the traditional
model, where a secret payment is made by manufacturers to PBMs in
exchange for favorable treatment, and only a portion of that payment
ever reaches the plans, it strikes us as a stretch to characterize rebates
as being made to plans rather than PBMs. 167 Rather, it would seem that
any payment for placement not intended as a pass-through can be best
characterized as a payment by the manufacturer in exchange for the
PBM’s agreement to influence formulary placement. In this regard, the
terms of the contract between both the manufacturer and the PBM and
the PBM and the plan would be relevant to determining the issue of
163. See Compliance Program Guidance, supra note 131, at 23736.
164. It appears that some PBMs may now be setting up offshore GPOs. See, e.g., Rebecca Pifer,
CVS Reportedly Creating Group Purchasing Organization for PBM Business, HEALTHCARE DIVE (July 1, 2020),
https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/cvs-reportedly-creating-group-purchasing-organization-forpbm-business/580889/ [https://perma.cc/3LPC-5MDY].
165. In pertinent part, the GPO safe harbor requires that the GPO “disclose in writing to the
entity at least annually, and to the Secretary upon request, the amount received from each vendor
with respect to purchases made by or on behalf of the entity.” 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(j)(2).
166. There are a few PBMs that are beginning to use a more transparent model under which all
rebates are passed through to the plans. See, e.g., Transformative Pass-Through Approach, NAVITUS,
https://www.navitus.com/pass-through-pbm [https://perma.cc/7QXK-J9E2]. On information and
belief, these are by far the exception.
167. In the preamble to the new rule, OIG notes that there is
a lack of transparency in the current system. With respect to rebates, we explained that
OIG work showed that some Part D plan sponsors had limited information about rebate
contracts and rebate amounts that their PBMs negotiated. A lack of transparency could
create a potential program integrity vulnerability because compliance with program
rules may be more difficult to verify.
Fraud and Abuse; Removal of Safe Harbor Protection for Rebates Involving Prescription
Pharmaceuticals and Creation of New Safe Harbor Protection for Certain Point-of-Sale
Reductions in Price on Prescription Pharmaceuticals and Certain Pharmacy Benefit Manager
Service Fees, 85 Fed. Reg. 76666, 76668 (Nov. 30, 2020).
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intent, as well as such considerations as the plan having title to the
rebate, knowledge of the amount of the rebate, and the amount charged
as PBM fees. However, we are aware of no authorities that give clear
guidance as to when a rebate should be considered to be paid to a plan
through a PBM and when it should be considered to be paid directly to
the plan. This ambiguity perhaps accounts for some of the lack of
enforcement activity.
F. Payments for Placement by Manufacturers to Plans Implicate the AKS and
Are Not Protected by the Discount Safe Harbor
Even when the payment is made to a plan, it cannot be made for
services and still be afforded protection under the discount safe
harbor. 168 Most fundamentally, the discount safe harbor protects
discounts, which are defined as “a reduction in the amount a
buyer . . . is charged for an item or service based on an arms-length
transaction.” 169 Among other exclusions, the term discount does not
include either “[s]ervices provided in accordance with a personal or
management services contract; or . . . [o]ther remuneration, in cash or
in kind, not explicitly described in paragraph (h)(5) of this section.” 170 In
other words, a payment that is made in return for a service is not a
discount within the meaning of the discount safe harbor. 171
As the Government explained in its brief in United States ex rel.
Herman v. Coloplast Corp.: 172
If [the distributor] CCS and [the manufacturer] Coloplast
simply agreed to a pricing structure that offered escalating
discounts in return for increased sales . . . then the United

168. There is some ambiguity about what constitutes a service. According to the government,
payments for marketing and for success in switching prescriptions to the payor’s drugs clearly do,
but payments only for formulary inclusion, do not. See PBM Final Rule, supra note 6.
169. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h)(5).
170. Id.
171. Formulary inclusion can be seen as analogous to a distributor’s decision to carry a drug
for resale, because it is the cheapest drug. Viewed in this way, payments for inclusion are
indistinguishable from any other purchasing decision driven by price, and, as such, are allowable if
they comply with the discount safe harbor. In other words, in order to allow price competition,
discounts must be allowed to incentivize, and be made contingent upon, a purchase. A discount
that is made contingent on the placement of the drug in a particular tier would be precluded,
however, as the latter requires specific “services”—that is, the application of utilization controls. In
a nutshell, incentivizing plans to prefer the discounted drug over others because it is cheaper,
remains permissible under this rule (and the reduced price may be a factor that results in the
imposition of utilization controls), but requiring plans to impose certain utilization controls (or to
do things, such as placing the drug in a particular tier, which amount to the same) remain
prohibited.
172. United States ex rel. Herman v. Coloplast Corp., 295 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D. Mass. 2018).
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States agrees that such an arrangement would qualify as a
“discount” and therefore would not violate the AKS. In contrast,
if CCS and Coloplast agreed that CCS would undertake patient
conversion and referral activities in return for Coloplast
granting price concessions, the United States submits that such
an agreement would not be a “discount” at all and would violate
the AKS. . . .
Relators’ allegations carry a reasonable inference that Coloplast
was paying CCS to use its special influence with its customers
to switch them to the Coloplast products. As alleged, CCS’s
agreement to undertake conversion campaigns in exchange for
the price concessions thus transformed the price concessions
into illegal kickbacks. Such an arrangement is different in kind
from merely offering escalating discounts in return for
increased sales volumes in an arms-length transaction. The
collusive quality of the arrangement alleged by the relators
fundamentally distorts the transparency of price competition in
the healthcare market that Congress sought to promote with
the discount exception. . . .
In a 1994 Special Fraud Alert, the HHS OIG made clear its view
that the AKS prohibits manufacturers from offering financial
incentives to those selling their products to effectuate “product
conversion” programs where one purpose is to induce the
increase [sic] use of such products covered by Federal health
care programs. 59 Fed. Reg. 65,371, 65,372, 65,376 (Dec. 19,
1994). One of the examples provided in the Special Fraud Alert
was of a “product conversion” program in which a drug
manufacturer provided supplier pharmacies with cash awards
for changing from a competitor’s product to the drug
manufacturer’s product. Id. at 65,376. A price concession is
functionally no different than such a cash award, regardless of
the label the parties use to describe it.
In sum, a price reduction conditioned on promotional or
conversion campaign activities is not a “discount” within the
meaning of the discount exception at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3).
A price reduction that is contingent on the recipient taking
affirmative steps to generate additional business for the seller
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does not foster price competition that inures to the benefits of
the federal health care system. 173
As discussed at length in Part II, tiering (or placement) decisions
are often made for the purpose of promoting one drug over another.
When such a payment is made for placement, it is being made not just
with the hope or expectation that the PBM (as agent of the plan) might
prefer the discounted product, but specifically in exchange for the PBM
taking specific action designed to promote a particular drug over its
competitors. In other words, the payment is made for the services of
the PBM in driving purchasing volume away from competitor products
and toward a given manufacturer’s products. More fundamentally, the
fact that payments for placement are often articulated in terms of a
percentage rebate on products sold by the manufacturer to plan
beneficiaries does not make them discounts in the true sense of the
word. Rather, they are payments made to plans and PBMs that are
contingent on formulary design services achieving the desired
outcome—driving sales volume toward the manufacturer’s product. It
seems clear, then, that payments for placement are not bona fide
173. United States’ Statement of Interest Regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court’s Dismissal of CCS, United States ex rel. Herman v. Coloplast Corp., 295 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D. Mass.
2018), http://www.fdalawblog.net/wp-content/uploads/archives/docs/Coloplast%20-%20US%20SOI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7G4C-JQLH]; cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. in Support
of Defendant CCS Med. Supplies, Inc.’s Motion to Reconsider the Court’s August 24, 2016 Order
or to Certify the Matter for Interlocutory Appeal, United States ex rel. Herman v. Coloplast
Corp., 295 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D. Mass. 2018), http://www.fdalawblog.net/wp-content/uploads
/archives/docs/Coloplast%20-%20PhRMA%20Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/FAU5-ZXW5]. For further
information, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Coloplast Corp. and Liberator Medical Agree
to Pay over $3.6 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Dec. 23, 2015), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/coloplast-corp-and-liberator-medical-agree-pay-over-36-million-resolvefalse-claims-act [https://perma.cc/9H9C-366Y] (announcing that Coloplast settled with the federal
government for $3.16 million); United States ex rel. Lisitza v. Johnson & Johnson, Ortho-McNeilJanssen Pharms., Inc., No. 07-cv-10288, 2011 WL 1827357 (D. Mass. May 12, 2011). After an
unsuccessful petition for reconsideration, Johnson & Johnson settled with the federal and state
governments for $149 million. See Johnson & Johnson to Pay More than $2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal
and Civil Investigations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnsonjohnson-pay-more-22-billion-resolve-criminal-and-civil-investigations [https://perma.cc/JF8T3MWE]. In another case, United States ex rel. Banigan v. Organon USA Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 277,
284 (D. Mass. 2012), the relators alleged that defendants Omnicare and PharMerica, two
institutional pharmacies, received kickbacks from a third defendant, drug manufacturer Organon.
Id. It appears that Omnicare settled for $23 million and Organon, the manufacturer, settled for $31
million. See Rachel Graf, Omnicare Pays $23M to End Kickback, Medicaid Fraud Suit, LAW360 (May 26,
2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/928510/omnicare-pays-23m-to-end-kickback-medicaidfraud-suit [https://perma.cc/2EN8-Y937]. In United States ex rel. Kester v. Novartis Pharms.
Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3d 242, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), Novartis settled for $370 million plus a $20 million
forfeiture of proceeds. See Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $370 Million Civil Fraud Settlement
Against Novartis Pharmaceuticals for Kickback Scheme Involving High-Priced Prescription Drugs, Along with
$20 Million Forfeiture of Proceeds from the Scheme, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 15, 2015), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-370-million-civil-fraudsettlement-against-novartis [https://perma.cc/KS5L-CZWB].
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discounts off list price that are provided in an arms-length transaction.
Rather, payments for placement are payments made by manufactures
to secure beneficial formulary design and formulary administration
services which redirect purchase volume away from competitor
products and toward the manufacturer’s products.
G. Effective AKS Enforcement Would Enable P&T Committees to
Meaningfully Protect Beneficiaries
Restricting manufacturers from paying PBMs rebates for formulary
placement should remove PBMs’ incentives to favor drugs that are more
profitable for them, and thus, more closely align the interests of PBMs
and P&T committees. This makes it more likely that PBMs will give
their P&T committees latitude to consider the full range of beneficiary
interests, and ultimately more likely that PBMs will adopt P&T
committee recommendations. Limiting manufacturers to incentivizing
plans for formulary access means that the relative cost of the drug, and
not the value of the rebate, is likely to drive purchasing decisions. Thus,
beneficiaries would benefit from lower drug prices in the form of either
pointof-service reductions (where the manufacturer offers a discount)
or premium reductions (where the manufacturer offers a rebate).
Rebates may still encourage plan sponsors to depart from the P&T
committee’s recommendation and prefer a drug that is most profitable
to the plan, but the plan must do so (1) of its own volition (i.e., without
the placement being dictated by pharmaceutical companies), which
would presumably weaken the effect of any volume-contingent
payment; and (2) in the face of a formal finding by the P&T committee
that an alternative formulary structure would have benefitted their
beneficiaries to a greater extent. This behavior may leave them open to
attack through a number of avenues: for ERISA plans, as breach of
fiduciary duty; for Part D plans, as being inconsistent with CMS
requirements; and for commercial plans, in a court of law (and in the
court of public opinion).
Because these laws prohibit PBMs from siphoning off a portion of
the payments for placement for their own account, funds should be
readily available for pass-through to beneficiaries who are burdened by
the attendant access restrictions. If these laws are properly enforced to
prohibit PBMs from conditioning formulary design decisions on receipt
of wheel-greasing payments from manufacturers, P&T committee
recommendations are more likely to carry the day. So, the P&T
committee would have both the latitude and the funds to protect
beneficiaries. Any impetus on the part of a plan to deviate from the
committee’s recommendations would be mitigated by the fact that such
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deviation would be an overt, documented departure from the best
interests of patients, which might be actionable under state laws
imposing fiduciary duties on PBMs 174 and principles of fiduciary duty
applicable to ERISA plans (which require that plan sponsors act in the
best interests of their beneficiaries and ensure that third parties they
employ do the same). 175 With respect to Medicare Part D plans, 176 the
departure would be obvious to CMS, and would seem inconsistent with
CMS’s concern that plan sponsors “perform adequate oversight of their
PBMs and other delegated entities to verify” that “utilization
management requirements applied at point of sale (POS), such as prior
174. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 683A.178 (West 2021) (“A pharmacy benefit manager has an
obligation of good faith and fair dealing toward a third party or pharmacy when performing duties
pursuant to a contract to which the pharmacy benefit manager is a party. Any provision of a
contract that waives or limits that obligation is against public policy, void and unenforceable.”).
175. See Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic
/healthplans/fiduciaryresp [https://perma.cc/2L8Q-QU28] (“The primary responsibility of
fiduciaries is to run the plan solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and for the
exclusive purpose of providing benefits and paying plan expenses. Fiduciaries must act prudently
and must diversify the plan’s investments in order to minimize the risk of large losses. In addition,
they must follow the terms of plan documents to the extent that the plan terms are consistent with
ERISA. They also must avoid conflicts of interest. In other words, they may not engage in
transactions on behalf of the plan that benefit parties related to the plan, such as other fiduciaries,
services providers, or the plan sponsor.”).
176. Healthcare reimbursement is governed by a complex and overlapping scheme of state and
federal law. Very generally, commercial health plans and the entities with which they contract are
subject to state law, while Medicare plans (Medicare Advantage plans and Medicare Part D plans)
are governed by federal law, and, more specifically, CMS regulation. See HEALTH LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 621–24, 628–35 (Barry R. Furrow, Thomas L. Greaney, Sandra H.
Johnson, Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Robert L. Schwartz, Brietta R. Clark, Erin C. Fuse Brown, Robert
Gatter, Jaime S. King & Elizabeth Pendo, eds., 8th ed. 2018). Employer-sponsored employee
benefit plans are regulated under the federal law, ERISA, which preempts the application of state
laws directed at regulating insurance. See Katherine L. Gudiksen, Samuel M. Chang & Jaime S.
King, Navigating Legal Challenges to State Efforts to Control Drug Prices: Pharmacy Benefit Manager
Regulation, Anti-Price Gouging Laws, and Price Transparency, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y
(2019), https://www.nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Legal-Challenges-to-State-Rx-Lawsfinal-9_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY3F-6LCP]. The scope of ERISA’s preemption of state law,
especially as it relates to entities (such as PBMs) that are contracted to provide services to ERISA
plans, is a complex and often-litigated matter. See, e.g., Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rutledge, 891
F.3d 1109, 1112–13 (8th Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded, 141 S. Ct. 474 (2020); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n
v. Gerhart, 852 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2017); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 613 F.3d
179 (D.C. Cir. 2010). For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that it is often unclear
whether regulation of particular PBM activities is preempted by ERISA. According to CMS:
The scope of Federal preemption is broad. MA standards set forth in 42 CFR 422
supersede any State laws, regulations, contract requirements, or other standards that
would otherwise apply to MA plans, with the exception of licensing laws and regulations
and laws and regulations relating to plan solvency. In other words, unless they pertain
to licensure and/or solvency, State laws and regulations that regulate health plans do
not apply to MA plans offered by MA organizations.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE MANAGED CARE MANUAL: CHAPTER 10 - MA
ORGANIZATION COMPLIANCE WITH STATE LAW AND PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL LAW 30.1 (2011),
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/mc86c10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3KV-HM34].
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authorization (PA), step therapy (ST), and quantity limits (QL) not based
upon the FDA’s maximum daily dose limits” not cause “beneficiary
harm due to impermissible delayed or denied access to Part D drugs.”177
We suggest that the P&T committee’s duty may extend to conditioning
their services upon their recommendations being respected.
CONCLUSION
Formularies are a useful tool in managing over-utilization and drug
costs. However, they impose burdens on beneficiaries. These burdens
are not ethically tolerable if they do not result in a comparable benefit to
beneficiaries. At present, the benefits are often siphoned off to PBMs in
the form of retained rebates, and there is no real commitment to
passing them through to beneficiaries. Ensuring that all rebates are
passed through to plans, and that they are not made in exchange for
formulary placement, will protect beneficiary interests.
The extant laws, regulations, and guidance detailed in Part III can
be used to address this problem and ensure that beneficiary interests
are better protected. Enforcing these principles would create an
environment where P&T committees are free to engage in a true
pharmacoeconomic analysis, and where that analysis—not
manufacturers—would dictate formulary placement. Even if the New
Rule is not implemented, at least for Part D and Medicaid managed
care plans, the AKS can be used to entirely preclude manufacturerrebates to PBMs and to plans for specific placement conditions. With
respect to other plans, state statutes can be used to achieve the same
result. By observing existing law and recognizing the distinctions
between payments to plans and payments to PBMs, as well as the
distinction between payments for coverage and payments for
placement, beneficiaries could be protected without further legislation.

177. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL:
CHAPTER 6 – PART D DRUGS AND FORMULARY REQUIREMENTS 30.2 (2016), https://www.cms.gov
/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Part-D-BenefitsManual-Chapter-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/68Q5-YLSA]. Notably, CMS approves plan formularies.
See id. (“CMS encourages Part D sponsors to submit formularies similar to those in widespread use
today. CMS will check the formulary to ensure inclusion of a range of drugs in a broad distribution
of therapeutic categories and classes, in order to satisfy the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA)
requirement that a sponsor’s categorization system does not substantially discourage enrollment
by any group of beneficiaries. CMS will consider the specific drugs, tiering and utilization
management strategies employed in each formulary. CMS will identify outliers from common
benefit management practices for further evaluation. Sponsors may be asked to provide written
clinical justification for unusual benefit features that are identified as outliers.”).

